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A QUESTION OF JUSTICE: THE WTO, AFRICA,

AND COUNTERMEASURES FOR BREACHES OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE OBLIGATIONS
NSONGURUA J. UDOMBANA*

"Anarchy - the threat (real or supposed) used to justify the WTO 1
bad for the weak, but the tyranny of the strong may be worse."

may be

INTRODUCTION
Contemporary international trade regimes are outcomes of the
international community's desire to promote stability and cooperation
through international economic relations. One of the purposes of the United
Nations (UN), itself a member of the international community, is to achieve
"international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic,
2
The UN has reiterated this
social, cultural, or humanitarian character."
the Declaration on the Right
including
sentiment in a number of instruments,
3
that sustained action is
inter
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noted,
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and called on
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required to promote
4
also
have, as one
institutions
Regional
states to cooperate for this purpose.
relations.
economic
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international
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the
of their basic objectives,
like the
such
purposes
for
solely
themselves
organize
Indeed, some states
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1. FATOUMA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE
REAL WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONs-LESSONS OF CANCUN 303-04
(2004) (countering the myth that developing countries are well-served by the WTO and
exposing the often brutish methods employed by the world's powerful states to impose
their agenda on the poorest).
2. U.N. Charter art. 1(3), para. 4 [hereinafter UN Charter]. See also id. art. 55
(providing for international cooperation in various fields, "[w]ith a view to the creation of
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations").
3. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc
A/Red/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986) [hereinafter DRD].
4. Id. art. 4(2). See generally Robert W. Gregg, The Politics of International
Economic Cooperation and Development, in POLITICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
106 (Lawrence S. Finkelstein ed. 1988).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:1153

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is an
intergovernmental organization designed to encourage multilateral dialogue
and cooperation
on economic and social policies that have transnational
5
effects.

The African Union (AU) lists the promotion of international
6
cooperation as one of its objectives, taking due account of the UN Charter.
Some human rights instruments have expressed similar sentiments. States
Parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights7 pledge, inter
alia, "to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a
better life for the peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation
having due regard to the [UN] Charter., 8 The Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that international cooperation for
development and, hence, for the realization of ECOSOC rights is an
obligation of all states. 9 This entails, presumably, obligations to develop
treaties promoting development and economic well-being and to establish
institutions and procedures to realize these goals.
There has been "an increasingly complex interdependence"' 10 in
contemporary times in a scale never known in history, an interdependence
that permeates all areas of international relations-political, economic, and
social. There has also been a growing concern with economic and
developmental issues, reflecting the adverse economic conditions in various
parts of the world." Africa, which the erstwhile Organization of African

5. The OECD replaced the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC) in 1960, which was set up to administer the Marshall Plan aid provided by the
United States to Europe in the aftermath of World War II. Current members of the OECD
are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korean Republic, Luxemburg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. OECD, OECD Member
Countries, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402-1 1_1_1
,00.html (last visited July 27, 2005).
6. See Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 3(e), July 11, 2000,
CABILEG/23.15, 479 (as amended by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive
Act of the AU, July 11, 2003) [hereinafter AU Act].
7. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter] (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1986).
8. Id. pmbl.
9. CESCR General Comment 3: The Nature of State Parties Obligations, art. 2 para.
1, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 5"h Sess. (1990), reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted By Human
Rights Treaty Bodies 18, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/l/Rev.5 (2001) (citing the DRD). See also
Sigrun Skogly, The Obligation of International Assistance and Co-operation in the
InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR THE DOWNTRODDEN: ESSAYS N HONOUR OF ASBJORN EIDE 403
(Morten Bergsmo ed., 2003).
10. Charles Beitz, Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism, 75(3) INT'L AFF. 516 (1999).
11. MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 825 (1997).
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Unity (OAU) 12 regards as "the most backward in terms of development from
whatever angle it is viewed,"' 3 is in dire need of sustained international

as enjoined by such
cooperation for sustainable economic development,
4

instruments as the UN Charter and the DRD.1
Several international institutions have sprung up in the last few decades
to provide systems of global governance and settings for webs of
relationships that shape and channel the operation of international economic
cooperation and other social intercourse, including the management of
conflicts. Most of these institutions sprung up in response to demands by the
international society, including national governments.' 5 As "physical entities
6
possessing offices, personnel, equipment, budgets, and so forth,"' they now
take on functions that, hitherto, were monopolistically regulated by states,
including control over currencies, 17 passports, and borders.' 8 They also play
a significant role in recognizing, legitimating, and empowering governments
as significant actors in global governance. 9
This Article, both a descriptive and prescriptive piece, explores some of
the legal and developmental issues arising from contemporary international
trade - as anchored by the World Trade Organization (WTO)- particularly
as they affect Africa. It argues that, contrary to the claims of the WTO
apologists, trade liberalization has little positive impact on Africa. The
distribution of benefits deriving from trade seldom takes account of Africa's
peculiar position and needs. Consequently, the continent's share and
participation in international economic exchanges and trade has continued to
fall. Developing countries are promised the tantalizing fruits of economic
liberalization - by keeping their markets open - but these fruits have failed
to materialize because of the North's repeated failure or neglect to make
reciprocal concessions demanded by the South.

12. Until July 2002, the OAU was Africa's continental political organization. The AU
succeeded the OAU. See AU Act, supra note 6, art. 33(1) (providing that the AU "Act
shall replace the Charter of the Organization of African Unity").
13. Yaound& Declaration, Africa: Preparing for the 21st Century, OAU Assembly, 32d
Ord. Sess., para. 2, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.3 (XXXII) (July 1996) [hereinafter Yaounde
Declaration].
14. See, e.g., DRD, supra note 3, art. 3(3) (providing: "States have the duty to cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to
development").
15. See Tom Keating, Testing the Limits of Global Governance, 2 MCGILL INT'L REV.
40 (2005).
16. Oran R. Young, InternationalRegimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions, 39
WORLD POLITICS 108 (1986).
17. Cf GREGORY MILLMAN, AROUND THE WORLD ON A TRILLION DOLLARS A DAY:
How REBEL CURRENCY TRADERS DESTROY BANKS AND DEFY GOVERNMENTS 101

(1995) (asserting that "[a] currency and an army had historically been the twin pillars of
national sovereignty").
18. See THEODORE H. COHN, GOVERNING GLOBAL TRADE: INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS IN CONFLICT AND CONVERGENCE 1 (2002); JACK DONNELLY, REALISM
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 131, 141 (2000).
19. See Keating, supra note 15, at 40. See generally CRAIG MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE (1994).
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Contemporary international trade regimes also leave unanswered many
questions of importance to developing states. For example, what is the
nature of economic interests or entitlement that defines a state? Do the same
interests define all states; that is, are the interests of the economically termed
North coterminous with those of the South? What is the legal standing of
each interest vis-gi-vis others? What options, from the point of view of
international economic law, are available to a state when its economic
interests are violated? Does that option include unilateral retaliation by the
aggrieved state or groups of states in order to redress the inequality and
restore equilibrium? How should Africa, in particular, go about redressing
inequalities arising from international economic law?
This Article will argue that the current WTO trade rules, "written
surreptitiously, and under the influence of the world's largest multilateral
corporations, 20 are far from equitable, ethical, sympathetic, or development
friendly. Although the WTO might have a noble vision of bringing about an
ordered global trade regime, the Northern Hemisphere has hijacked the WTO
as an instrument of imperialism against the Southern Hemisphere. Today,
the WTO rules and practices threaten the sovereignty and sustainable
development of developing countries, a real, immense, and unceasing threat.
The Article begins by assessing the impact of the WTO regime on
developing economies in the context of its set vision and mission. It
illustrates how selective implementations and breaches of trade rules
undermine the international trade regime and, in particular, the economies of
Africa (Part I). The Article proceeds to examine the WTO remedies and
concludes that they have failed to checkmate flagrant breaches of trade rules
by the industrial countries, especially as the assumed remedies are
inaccessible to developing countries (Part II). The Article proceeds to
examine countermeasures under general international law and urges Africa
to adopt unilateral measures to counterpoise breaches of international trade
obligations and to strengthen its domestic economy and bargaining power in
global trade negotiations (Part III). This Article, however, sees potential in a
reformed WTO and, thus, outlines reform areas so that "this vitally important
institution for the future' 21 can maximize its potentials (Part IV).
This Article adopts a nuanced interpretative methodology, integrating
the traditional legal exegesis with other approaches - including economic
theories - to deepen insights into the nature of the problem. Examining the
WTO trade regime demands an interdisciplinary analysis. Besides, a
pragmatic methodology is needed to respond to the legal, economic, and
political imperatives of globalization.22

20. Lori Wallach, It's Not About Trade, in WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO 1, 4 (Lori Wallach & Patrick Woodall eds., 2004).
21. Supachai Panitchpakdi, Forwardto PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., THE FUTURE OF
THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 3

(2004) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF THE WTO].
22. Cf Jeffery M. Brown, Black Internationalism:Embracingan Economic Paradigm,
23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 807, 810 (2002).
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THE WTO, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT

The UN provides the bedrock of modem international institutions,
focusing on global political security. The WTO and the Bretton Woods
sisters - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, popularly called the World Bank form the backbone of a contemporary international economic legal system
that focuses on global economic security. International non-governmental
organizations (INGOs) have joined the fray and are influencing, in diverse
ways, the norm creation and decision-making process within international
institutions. Notable examples of the INGOs are the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) and the World Economic Forum (WEF). All of this has
considerably limited the autonomy of states, with serious implications for
developing countries.
This Part examines how the constraints of realpolitick have derailed
the vision of the WTO, causing some members of the club to benefit from
the substance of free trade while others, largely African countries, walk in its
shadows.
A.

Towards a Vision of Better Trade Governance

Free trade is the modem day religion 23 and the WTO is its prophet.
The WTO was established in 199524 to provide a much-needed institutional
solidity to the world trading system.
Its vision is the rules-based
liberalization of international trade through the removal of special
preferences and the imposition of uniform trade rules. Its mission is to
"provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade
relations among its Members ' 25 in order to achieve better trade governance.26
Both its vision and mission are founded upon the philosophy that
international trade benefits all parties, all things being equal (though all
things are rarely equal) and that free trade is key to sustained economic
growth.

23. See, e.g., John Kenneth Galbraith, Agricultural Policy: Ideology, Theology and
Reality Over the Years, Speech to National Governor's Conference at Harvard University
(July 27, 1987) ("No one can be without sin who does not at least daily affirm his belief in
the profound beneficence of free market forces."), quoted in Kevin Watkins, Free Trade
and Farm Fallacies: From the Uruguay Round to the World Food Summit, 26 THE
ECOLOGIST 244 (1996).
24. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. For the Marrakesh Agreement and its annexes, see
WTO, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
4 (1999)
[hereinafter LEGAL TEXTS], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs -e/legal-e/legal-texts-e.htn (last visited Sept. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter referred to, without any cross reference, as WTO web site].
25. Id. art. II.1.

26. See generally Sylvia Ostry, WTO: InstitutionalDesign for Better Governance, in
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE
MILLENNIUM 361 (Roger Porter et al. eds., 2001) (proposing improvements to WTO

governance through incremental initiatives).
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The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement sets out a list of noble
goals. One goal is to conduct international trade with a view to "raising
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the
production of and trade in goods and services."27 Another goal is to allow
"for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development." 28 The Agreement even recognizes
the "need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries,
and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth
in international29 trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.,
The development-oriented goals of the Marrakesh Agreement
correspond fairly with those in some human rights instruments. Examples
include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' 30 rights to life,31 to
work, 32 and to an adequate standard of living; 33 the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' 34 right to "an adequate standard of
living.., including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions, ' '35 and "the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health;, 36 and, back home, the African Charter's rights to health, 37 to
education, 38 and to development. 39 Obviously, symmetries exist between
trade, development, and human rights; and Han Park has revealed that
economic development serves as the strongest predictor of improved basic
needs achievement.40
The establishment of the WTO has been hailed as "the most dramatic
advance in multilateralism since the inspired period of institution building of

27. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 24, pmbl. CfJohn H. Jackson, Interdisciplinary
Approaches to International Economic Law: Reflections on the "Boilerroom" of
InternationalRelations, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 595, 603 (1995) (observing that
current trade liberalization policies are designed to promote enhancement of world
welfare).
28. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 24, pmbl.
29. Id.
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
31. Id. art. 3.
32. Id. art. 23.
33. Id. art. 25.
34. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
35. Id. art. 11(1).
36. Id. art. 12(1).
37. African Charter, supra note 7, art. 16.
38. Id. art. 17.
39. Id. art. 22.
40. See Han S. Park, Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies, 9 HUM RTS. Q.
405, 410-13 (1987). See also Bruce E. Moon & William J. Dixon, Politics, the State, and
Basic Human Needs: A Cross NationalStudy, 29 AM. J. POL. Sci. 661, 689-90 (1985).
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the late 1940s.,, 41 The institution has grown to become nearly an empire and
has measurably pulled the major players towards multilateral solutions to
trade issues. The global economy has undoubtedly experienced some
positive growth since its establishment. The 2001 WTO Ministerial
Declaration, adopted in Doha, Qatar, applauded the contribution of free trade
to growth, development and employment, and emphasized the importance of
continued trade liberalization to the promotion of recovery, growth, and
development.4 2
Andrew Guzman is among scholars that celebrate "the remarkable
success of the GATT/WTO system., 43 He maintains that the WTO is "one
of the world's most dominant international institutions, establish[ing] a
reasonably effective system of dispute resolution, and develop[ing] a nearly
universal membership. ' 44 For Sylvia Ostry, the "power" and "effectiveness"
of the WTO have become magnets for expansionist ideas.45 For Judith
Bello, "[t]he genius of the GATT/WTO system is the flexibility with which
it accommodates the national exercise of sovereignty, yet promotes
compliance with its trade rules through incentives." 4 The same viewpoint
has been put forward in the United States to make membership in the WTO
more palatable to constituencies concerned about the supranational powers
of the organization.47
When one peels back the outer layers of the WTO, one finds, in the
expressive words of Deborah Cass, a "[f]ack of representation of citizens in
the international trade law decision-making, an absence of local political
participation, the existence of only rudimentary structures of
constitutionalism, the difficulty of defining a community to authorize any
constitutional structure, and the inability of individuals to rely directly upon
WTO law."A8 Other fears about free trade are that it "will promote a
materialistic style of development, enable [transnational corporations] to

41 See THE FUTURE OF THE WTO, supra note 21, at 9 (offering a rousing defense of
multilateral trade liberalization and making practical suggestions on how the WTO could
work better).
42. See Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, at 1 (Nov. 14, 2001),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0l_e/mindecle.htm
[hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration](last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
43. Andrew Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 303
(2004).
44. Id.
45. Sylvia Ostry, The WTO and International Governance, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION MILLENNIUM ROUND 285, 290, 293 (Klaus Gunter Deutsch & Bernhard
Speyer eds., 2001) (stating that the WTO has become a magnet for policy overload).
46. Judith H. Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996).
47. See Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's
Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 561, 564 (2002)
(comparing Judith Bello's view with those held by other scholars "attribut[ing] a more
supranational character to the WTO").
48. Deboarah Cass, The 'Constitutionalization' of International Trade Law: Judicial
Norm-Generation as the Engine of ConstitutionalDevelopment in InternationalTrade, 12
EUR. J. INT'L L. 39, 44-45 (2001).
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dominate the world, accelerate privatization and 'marketisation,' emaciate
national governments,
destroy communities, preclude alternative
development options, facilitate the monopoly of a particular world view and
inundate traditional societies with the hedonistic culture of the West.''49 The
next segment examines some of these problems in detail.
B. Between Vision and Reality
The central thesis of this Article is that the WTO trade regime has not
benefited, and cannot benefit, all parties because it operates like the Animal
Farm.50 In Orwell's classic, animals take over the running of a farm, and
everything is wonderful for a while - until the pigs get out of hand and take
most of the power for themselves, thinking that they are the best
administrators of government. Power ultimately corrupts them, as it does
humans, and they turn on their fellow animals, eliminating competitors
through propaganda and bloodshed. Though written to reveal the hypocrisy
of communism, as practiced in the then Soviet Union, 51 Animal Farm is
surprisingly relevant to an understanding of contemporary international trade
relations. Although all animals are equal under the WTO regime, based on
the concept of sovereignty and equality of states, 52 the practice of trade
reveals that some animals - the industrial countries - are more equal than
others. This segment examines reasons for this glitch.
1.

The WTO Has a 'SecretRelationship to Mystery'
Lori Wallach writes: "The WTO is a mechanism to bring every country
in the world - ready or not - into an existing global market designed by
corporations, and to take the practices those corporations invented willy-nilly
- which, of course, suit their needs - and set them in stone as 'WTO
rules.' 53 Apologists of free trade will dismiss such assertions as baseless or
even as rantings of a disgruntled scholar. The WTO itself believes that
criticisms of its activities often stem from fundamental misunderstandings of
its works. It asserts that it is a "member-driven" organization where
decisions are negotiated, accountable and democratic, and that, in the
absence of a multilateral regime like the WTO, "the more powerful countries
49. GRAHAM DUNKLEY, THE FREE TRADE ADVENTURE: THE WTO, THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND GLOBALISM - A CRITIQUE 102-03 (2000).
50. See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM passim (Penguin Books, 1951).
51. The aim of communism was to make workers of the world masters of their own
fate, enabling them to enjoy in freedom and peace the wealth their labor created. This
entailed sweeping away the capitalists, who, the communists alleged, appropriated the
lion's share of what the workers produced - due to their ownership of the means of
production. The 1917 revolution in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics liquidated the
Czar, the aristocracy and the capitalists but replaced it with communist czars and petty
rulers as despotic as their predecessors.
52.

Cf IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW 289 (1998)

("The sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional doctrine of the
law of nations.").
53. Wallach, supra note 20, at 2 (asserting further that "the WTO and its agreements
are a powerful mechanism for spreading and locking in corporate-led globalization").
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would be freer to impose their will unilaterally on their smaller trading
partners., 54 The 'Economist, unashamedly the mouthpiece of Western
capitalism, echoes this sentiment. In 2001, it wrote that the WTO is a no
would-be tyrant; that it is democratic to a fault; that it has few powers of its
own; and that its rules are devised and altered solely by its members through
How
Really?
consensus, through the requirement of unanimity.55
democratic is an organization that is dominated by a few major industrial
countries? How effective is the participation of developing countries in
negotiations leading to decision-making in the WTO?
Certainly, there is much motion in the WTO by developing-country
members, though the degree of a corresponding movement is uncertain.
Different sources point to the absence of freedom of speech or association in
the WTO;5 6 to the "lack of transparency and inclusiveness" in trade
negotiations and decision-making processes; 57 and to the fact that only a few
developing-country members are able to participate effectively in these
processes.58 At times, if not at all times, developing country members are
forced to swallow the bitter pills of trade liberalization through arm-twisting,
intimidation, and deception by the industrial countries. The curious and
patronizing assumption is that the developed countries know what is best for
their developing counterparts!
59
The WTO, says Anne Orford, has a "secret relationship to mystery"
and remains a dictatorial tool of the rich and powerful, despite its democratic
pretensions. Even The Economist now admits that "[m]ore than any other
country, America still sets the tone of the global trading system.., and its
leadership has been essential to completing every global trade round since
60
the modem multilateral system was set up after the second world war."
Joseph Stiglitz, the 2001 Nobel laureate in economics and former chief
economist at the World Bank, stated:

54. WTO, 10 BENEFITS OF THE WTO TRADING SYSTEM 4 (2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/lOben-e/lObOOe.htm (last visited Sept.
28, 2005) [hereinafter 10 BENEFITS OF THE WTO TRADING SYSTEM].
55. Who Elected the WTO? THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 2001.
56. Federico Cuello, press conference launching Behind the Scenes at the WTO (Sept.
2, 2003), cited in JAWARA & KWA, supra note 1, at lxvi, lxxix (remarking on U.S.
bullying of developing countries in the WTO).
57. See, e.g., Declaration on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, AU Assembly, 2d
Ord. Sess. para. 9, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Decl.4 (II) (July 2003) [hereinafter Declaration
on the Fifth Ministerial Conference].
58.

See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A

FRAGMENTED WORLD 121 (2002) [hereinafter UNDP REPORT 2002] (noting that low and
medium human development countries have poor representation in negotiations on
international conventions).
59. Anne Orford, Trade, Human Rights and the Economy of Sacrifice, 03/04 JEAN
MONNET WORKING PAPER 1, 2 (2004), availableat www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/

04/040301.pdf (last visited July 10, 2005).
60. Time to Deliver the Goods, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2005, at 61.
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[W]e have a system that might be called global governance without global

government, one in which a few institutions-the World Bank, the IMF, the
WTO-and a few players-the finance, commerce, and trade ministries,
closely linked to certain financial and commercial interests-dominate the
scene, but6 1in which many of those affected by their decisions are left almost
voiceless.

The November 1999 Seattle ministerial meeting exposed the "secret
relationship" in the WTO; it was the first round of trade negotiations after
the conclusion of Uruguay Round. Chris Milner and Robert Read reported
that, during that meeting, "many developing-country members were
effectively disenfranchised in that they were virtually excluded from the
crucial 'Green Room process' in negotiating the agenda and were neither
canvassed on their views concerning many issues of critical importance to
them nor informed about the decisions taken on their behalf., 62 Gilbert
Winham also described the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations - one of the
pre-negotiation rounds of the Uruguay Round - as a pyramid process,
where "issues tended to be first negotiated between the United States and the
EC [European Community]; and once a tentative trade-off was established
the negotiation process was progressively expanded to include other
countries. In this way co-operation between the United States and the EC
served to direct the negotiation., 63 The latest 'Round' - the Doha
Development Round - is not any different. As Bhagirath Das writes, the
Doha Work Program is "not the result of any serious negotiation among the
members of the WTO. The major developed countries have not engaged in
any negotiation of give-and-take type; they just
put up their proposals and
64
asked the developing countries to accept them.,
The international economic system, according to Jarrod Wiener, is "an
outgrowth of the internal systems of economy of the largest and most
influential states, in the sense that international policies have reflected their
domestic priorities.,, 65 The liberalization of the mid-1800s prompted the
domestic pressures that the Industrial Revolution wrought in Britain and the
form in which international finance evolved from Britain's policy of
maintaining a gold standard. Similarly, pressures in the United States during
the Great Depression and the transfer of hegemony from Britain prompted
the mechanisms of the Bretton Woods system.66 Today, it is the rich

61. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 22 (2002) (describing
the many ways in which the major institutions of globalization, including the WTO, have
failed the struggling countries they were meant to serve).
62. Chris Milner & Robert Read, Introduction: The GATT Uruguay Round, Trade
Liberalizationand the WTO, in TRADE LIBERALIZATION, COMPETITION AND THE WTO 1
(Chris Milner & Robert Read eds., 2002).
63. Gilbert Winham, The PrenegotiationPhase of the Uruguay Round, 44(2) INT'L J.
289-90 (1989).
64. Bhagirath Lal Das, The New Work Programme of the WTO, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK, April 8, 2002, available at www.twnside.org.sg/title/das.doc (last visited July

10, 2005).
65. JARROD WIENER, GLOBALIZATION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF LAW 54 (1999).
66. Id.
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industrial countries that dominate the international economic systems,
shaping their rules and regulations, their institutions and policies for trade,
money, and finance. According to Leroy Trotman, the major players in the
contemporary international economic order (IEO) "were the vision and
developers of the new order; it was the smaller less powerful who sought
association, in response to the offer of a better opportunity to participate for
the benefit of their communities, and who entered an association where the
67
rules, good or bad, were already prepared for others.
The Quadrilaterals or Quads - Canada, EU, Japan, and the United
States - and the 'unseen hands' of other trade-related institutions, including
the OECD and the Group of Eight Most Industrialized Countries (G8),
68
Some of the most
control the decision-making processes in the WTO.
breakthroughs
initial
required
have
talks
trade
in
negotiations
difficult
are
institutions
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Bretton
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and
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Further,
Quads.
the
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designed
architects
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because
so,
deliberately
and
institutions,
integrated
69
Several
them to project the Washington Consensus policies globally.
the
provide
laws
soft
other
and
Agreement
Marrakesh
the
in
provisions
normative basis for institutional cooperation and specifically address the
WTO's relationship with the IMF. The reverse, however, is not the case understandably because the articles of the IMF were elaborated long before
the establishment of the WTO - though some IMF articles authorize
and set forth the basis for
relationships with other international organizations
7°
cooperation between the two organizations.
The Marrakesh Agreement mandates the WTO to cooperate with the
Bretton Woods institutions "with a view to achieving greater coherence in
'71
The Declaration on the Contribution of
global economic policy-making.
67. Leroy Trotman, The WTO: The Institutional Contradictions, in DOHA AND
BEYOND: THE FUTURE OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 19, 21 (Mike Moore,
ed., 2004).
68. For an analysis of these institutions' role in global trade, see COHN, supra note 18,
at 3-8, 132-41.
69. See Anne-Marie Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism,InternationalLaw,
and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 50 (Robert Howse ed.,
reprintedin MULTILATERALISM MATTERS 125 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993).

1988),

70. See, e.g., Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. X, July 22,
1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (as amended through June 28, 1990) (stating: "The
Fund shall cooperate within the terms of this Agreement with any general international
organization and with public international organizations having specialized responsibilities
in related fields").
71. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 24, art. 111.5. See also id. art. XV (setting out
both the principle of WTO consultations with the IMF and the scope and effect of such
consultations). For a history of GATT and the Bretton Woods system, see Dukgeun Ahn,
Linkages Between InternationalFinancialand Trade Institutions: IMF, World Bank and
WTO, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 2000, at 1, 3-5. See generally, ROBERT HUDEC, THE
GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (2d ed., 1990); OLIVER LONG,
LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1985);
ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM (1978);

Gerald A. Bunting, GATT and the Evolution of the Global Trade System: A Historical
Perspective, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 505 (1996).
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the [WTO] to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic
Policymaking 72 states:
The interlinkages between the different aspects of economic policy require that
the international institutions with responsibilities in each of these areas follow
consistent and mutually supportive policies. The [WTO] should therefore
pursue and develop cooperation with the international organizations
responsible for monetary and financial matters, while respecting the mandate,
the confidentiality requirements and the necessary autonomy in decisionmaking procedures of each institution, and avoiding the imposition on
73
governments of cross-conditionality or additional conditions.
Consequent upon these normative provisions, the IMF and similar
bodies participate regularly in the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related
Technical Assistance with the WTO. Like the WTO, forty-eight percent of
the IMF's voting rights are concentrated in the hands of seven states: United
States, Japan, France, UK, Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia. These states
also control forty-six percent of voting rights at the World Bank.74 The
existing bond between the WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions
illustrates the "mosaic" nature of modem international institutions. As John
Jackson writes:
International regulation of international trade is... an extraordinarily complex
and muddled affair, involving a wide variety of organizations and
institutions ... when one considers GATT, it is necessary to relate it to the
mosaic and ever-changing picture of other international institutions. In some
cases the institutions complement each other in important wa ,s... Inother
cases the subject-matter attention of these institutions overlaps.
The point here is that trade, investment, and finance institutions all
serve transatlantic political and economic interests. They constitute, in B.
Chimni's words, "a nascent global state whose function is to realise the
interests of transnational capital and powerful states in the international
system to the disadvantage of third world states and peoples [and that] [t]he
evolving global state formation may therefore be described as having an
76
imperial character.,

72. Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving
Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking, in LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 24.

73. Id.para. 5. Cf Agreement Between the International Monetary Fund and the
World Trade Organization, Dec. 9, 1996 [hereinafter Cooperation Agreement], reprinted
in 25 SELECTED DECISIONS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND 705 (2000) [hereinafter SELECTED DECISIONS] (implementing the legal

relationship between the organizations and including several provisions on document
exchange, reciprocal attendance at meetings, and other matters that facilitate cooperation).
74. UNDP REPORT 2002, supra note 58, at 113.
75.

JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 11 (1969).

76. B. S. Chimni, InternationalInstitutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the
Making, 15(1) EUR.J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2004).
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The More Africa Liberalizes, the Less It Trades
International trade is based on the economic theories of comparative
advantage and economies of scale. The theory of comparative advantage,
pioneered by the 19th century economist David Ricardo-in his time called
"comparative costs" - is based on the idea that all countries can raise their
living standards through specialization and trade. It posits that countries
should produce goods where they have an advantage over other states. Even
if one country can make everything at a lesser cost than every other, it still
gains from focusing on the goods in which its relative advantage is greatest,
that is, in which it has a comparative advantage." The theory of economies
of scale is built on the idea that specialization in the production of goods and
services leads to lower (average) production costs. It assumes that the cost
of tariff reductions in favor of one state is warranted only when a trading
78
partner obtains an offsetting benefit from a reciprocal tariff concession.
These theories, however, have their flip sides, including the possibility that a
country's export prices could fall so much that it becomes worse off.
The WTO believes that "[a]mbitious liberalization of tariffs and nontariff barriers carries with it the potential to underpin faster economic
growth, which, in turn, could significantly increase the living standards of
79
people around the world." Admittedly, a few developing countries, mostly
the upper-middle income countries, have made appreciable gains by
integrating their economies into the international trading system. They have
also broken into new markets in the last couple of years, with their share in
world trade rising strongly.8 0 Developing countries' share in manufacturing,
for example, has risen from seventeen percent in 1990 to twenty-seven
percent in 2000.81 Evidence, however, shows that the blessings of world
trade have not spread evenly; while some societies have been able to share
some of the benefits of economic growth and welfare resulting from free
8
trade, others have remained excluded and increasingly marginalized. ' A
few powerful nations particularly benefit from the blessings of free trade,83
"under the guise of 'democracy,' 'openness' and a 'neutral' Secretariat.,
2.

77. See Gerhard Loibl, International Economic Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 689,
690 n. 1 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
78. See Kyle Bagwell et al., It's a Question of Market Access, 96 AM J. INT'L L. 56, 59
(2002).
79. Cf WTO, ANNUAL REPORT 2003, 3 (2003) [hereinafter WTO ANNUAL REPORT
2003].
80.

See CONSTANTINE MICHALOPOULOS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO

1

(2001) (noting that trade in some developing countries has grown proportionately since the
early 1990s).
81. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2005: TRADE, REGIONALISM
AND DEVELOPMENT (2004).

82. See generally Friedl Weiss & Paul De Waart, InternationalEconomic Law with a
Human Face: An Introductory View, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN
FACE 2 (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998).
83. See JAWARA & KWA, supra note 1, at 269.
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For many developing countries, the new dawn promised by Uruguay Round
has turned into darkness due to the asymmetries in the implementation of
free trade.84
Available evidence shows that Africa's economy is experiencing
increasing and serious deterioration in terms of trade, despite tremendous
efforts deployed by its governments to reorganize and restructure their
economies, often at a very high social cost. 85 Trade liberalization has
worked to undermine the comparative advantages that Africa might have
had, aggravating their development problems and leading to the abuse of
labor standards and human rights. The challenges and problems that
prompted many African countries to join the WTO - the regeneration and
reviving of their economies in order to achieve a better life for their citizens
- have remained, years after their accession to the WTO agreements. Even
Joseph Stiglitz claims a direct cause and effect relationship between Africa
and the Uruguay Round and insists that the Round has worsened the
Continent's situation.86
Of course, the WTO is quick to roll out figures showing benefits of
trade liberalization for Africa. Its 2003 Annual Report indicates that trade
growth in Africa in 2002-2003 "was at about the same pace as the global
average, which under current circumstances, was an important and welcome
achievement." 87 Its 2004 Report estimates that Africa's Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) growth reached 3.6 percent in 2003, "the highest expansion
rate since 2000. " 88 It also indicates that the number of African countries
reporting a decline in their export value in 2003 dropped to four - "the
lowest level for the entire 1990-2003 period" - but it admits that "eight
African countries exported less in 2003 than in 1990. " 89 Comparatively,
China's export growth for the corresponding period "was two times faster
than that of world exports." 90

84. See Jeffrey Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and
Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 979, 981 (2001). See also JOE OLOKAONYANGO & DEEPIKA UDAGAMA, THE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: GLOBALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FULL ENJOYMENT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS [hereinafter REPORT ON GLOBALIZATION] (noting that liberalization has

become "a veritable nightmare" for certain sectors of humanity, citing, inter alia, patents
and their adverse effects on pharmaceutical prices). The preliminary report submitted by
J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama was in accordance with Sub-Commission
Resolution 1999/8, para. 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2i2000/13 (2000).
85. Algiers Declaration, OAU 35th Assembly of Heads of State and Government,
OAU Doc. AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXV) (July 1999) [hereinafter Algiers Declaration].
86. See STIGLITZ, supra note 61, at 245.
87. WTO ANNUAL REPORT 2003, supra note 79, at 2.
88. WTO, WORLD TRADE DEVELOPMENTS tN 2003 AND PROSPECTS FOR 2004, 11

(2004)

[hereinafter

WORLD

TRADE

DEVELOPMENTS

IN

2003],

available at

http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/statis-e/its2004-e/its4-general-overview-c.htm
(last
visited Sept. 20, 2005) (reporting how real merchandise trade growth in Africa was
boosted by a higher export volume of mining products, which is Africa's principal export
sector).
89. Id. at 12.
90. Id. at 1.
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International economic institutions should put faces on events, rather
than just reel out statistics. Development is not about statistics, but about
lives and jobs. The reality is that output and trade in Africa have continued
to shrink over the decades, with its share of world trade collapsing from
around six percent in 1980 to two percent in 2002.91 A sectoral analysis of
world trade for 2003 shows that very few goods entered the North from
Africa through "market access," even in traditional areas as textiles and
was less
agriculture. Africa's share of world trade in textiles and clothing
92
than four percent in 2003, compared to forty-five percent for Asia. Further,
Africa's share of agricultural products over the 1990-2003 periods has
transitional
decreased by fourteen percent, with Western Europe and
93
agricultural exports.
economies now accounting for one half of world
A contrario,Africa is offering the North unlimited market access and is
taking on obligations in services and intellectual property that involve
restructuring domestic economies. The General Agreement on Trade and
94
Services (GATS) provides the developed countries with new tools to pry
open developing country markets. International sales of services of United
States affiliates abroad was $432 billion in 2001 alone, exceeding the value
95
of its exports from home in the second half of the 1990s. The Agreement
96
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) has tripped the
balance against the South by forcing them to adopt patent and copyright
legislation for the benefit of the North and, of course, their multinational
corporations.97 Often, these domestic changes have negative implications on
welfare and human rights. Notwithstanding that TRIPS favors foreign
corporate interests, the WTO has failed to elaborate similar agreements on
trade-related labor rights - except prison labor - or on trade-related
environmental measures to cater for developing country interests. The
Washington Consensus links protection of property rights to growth and

WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING
in
COUNTRIES 2002: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR THE WORLD'S POOR (2002), cited

91. See

FOR
COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, OUR COMMON INTEREST: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

AFRICA

246 (2005) [hereinafter

OUR COMMON INTEREST].

92. WORLD TRADE DEVELOPMENTS IN 2003, supra note 88, at 7.
93. See id. at 5 (noting that world exports of agricultural products in 2003 expanded by
fifteen percent to $674 billion, "exceeding the previous peak level of 1996").
94. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1168 (1994)
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lB [hereinafter
GATS], in LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 24. The GATS is a framework agreement imposing
a common set of standards to be applied to service industries with respect to which states
undertake obligations.
95. See WORLD TRADE DEVELOPMENTS IN 2003, supra note 88, at 4.
96. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], in LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 24.
97. Jeffrey Dunoff, Is the World Trade Organization Fair to Developing States? 97
A.S.I.L. PROC. 153, 154 (2003).
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innovation and treats environmental and human rights as "luxury goods, a
kind of gratification to be postponed until unrestrained industrial or
postindustrial capitalism produces high real incomes. '98
Africa has witnessed a near stagnation in the last three decades and
continues to be vulnerable to globalization and trade liberalization for several
reasons. Part of the reasons include key problems in the "supply side" issues
of market access, such as Africa's low capacity to produce and trade
competitively in commodities, manufactured goods, and services. The
composition of Africa's exports has essentially remained unchanged, with
over-dependence on primary production and resource-based sectors, 99 which
is "a product of the colonial and post-colonial division of labor between the
core regions of the industrialized world and the non-industrialized
periphery." 1° A recent UNDP survey reveals that "primary commodities
account for more than two-thirds of exports in 16 of the 23 top or high
priority Sub-Saharan countries with data."' 01
Some developing countries have benefited from the vast growth that
the manufacturing sector has experienced in the last two decades and where
global levels of protection have reduced significantly; yet Africa has
benefited little because of its focus on agriculture, where growth has been
slower and where significant protection still remains.'0 2 Often, Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) is not mentioned in certain merchandise and commercial
services sectors of world trade, such as Information and Communications
Technologies (ICTs), iron and steel, chemicals and automotive products.' 0 3
A direct correlation exists between commodity dependence and poverty
levels, especially in circumstances of perennially declining prices. 0 4 Prices
of primary products hardly move up due to a variety of factors, including the
98. Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-andBack Again: The Fate of the
Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 104 (2002). For a critique of this
position, see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
99. OAU, The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), para. 156 (Oct.
2001) [hereinafter NEPAD].
"African economies are vulnerable because of their
dependence on primary production and resource-based sectors, and their narrow export
bases. There is an urgent need to diversify production and the logical starting point is to
harness Africa's natural resource base". Id.
100. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 436
n. 11 (2002) (citing E.M. YOUNG, WORLD HUNGER 41 (1997)).
101.

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

REPORT 2004, 134 (2004) [hereinafter UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004].
102. M. Ataman Aksoy, The Evolution of Agricultural Trade Flows, in GLOBAL
AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 17, 22 (M. Ataman Aksoy & John
Beghin eds., 2005) [hereinafter GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES].

103. See WORLD TRADE DEVELOPMENTS IN 2003, supra note 88, at 6 (reporting that
the major exporters of chemicals include the United States, Canada, Mexico, the EU,
Japan, China, Republic of Korea, Singapore, India and Malaysia).
104. See Declaration on the Ongoing Review of the EU Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and Its Impact on Trade in Commodities With ACP Countries, AU Assembly, 3d
Ord. Sess., pmbl., Assembly/AU/Decl.13 (III) (July 2004) [hereinafter Declaration on
Review of CAP].
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fact that demands for such products do not usually correlate with increase in
income. There is also, on the one hand, a general decline in the share of
05
agricultural products in global trade and, on the other hand, a permanent
world oversupply of virtually everything that Africa could offer. There is
very little extra room for absorption of African exports.
Africa also has been a major player in its own marginalization, largely
through wrong-footed economic and regulatory policies and strategies.
Many governments have failed to address themselves to the imperatives of
globalization, which require utilizing imaginative policies and strategies
necessary to compete favorably in a growing competitive international
environment. There are also numerous obstacles that many governments
place in the way of private investments. Bad and pointless regulations
continue to foster graft and corruption. To register a business in Ethiopia a Least Developed Country (LDC) - "a would-be entrepreneur must deposit
the equivalent of 18 years' average income in a bank account, which is then
frozen;"' 10 6 yet experiences in several rich countries show that such capital
10 7
multiple procedures to
Similarly, it takes
requirements are unnecessary.
10 8
Nigeria.
in
transaction
property
a
record or register
The Economist concludes that "businesses in poor countries shoulder
three times the administrative costs and have to struggle through twice as
10 9
in rich countries."'
many bureaucratic procedures as their counterparts
This is hardly a testimony to a Continent that has more reason to speed up
development than the advanced economies.
Equal Treatment of Unequals in InternationalTrade Breeds Inequality
The sense of injustice is sometimes seen as a capricious sentiment. The
reason is because justice is "a complex and shifting balance between many
' 1°
It is not equality simpliciter; it is proportional
factors, including equality."
equality. Nevertheless, the demand for equality has as its source the desire
for fair play. Thus, certain objective criteria may be used to determine if an
IEO is just. One criterion is that the rules of such an order should be applied
uniformly to ensure an equal playing field among all participants,' though
3.

105. See WORLD TRADE DEVELOPMENTS IN 2003, supra note 88, at 5 ("While the share
of agricultural products was about the same as in the preceding two years, at 9 percent, it
remained 2 percent below the average level recorded in the 1990s.").
106. Measure First, Then Cut, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2004, at 77 (reviewing a
World Bank study showing that bad regulations are a huge brake on global growth).
107. Id.
108. See id. (noting, rather sweepingly, that land is useless as a collateral in Nigeria
because "[i]ts owners typically cannot prove, legally, that they own it").
109. Id.
110. RWM DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 66 (1985).
111. Aristotle pioneered the analysis of justice and put forward the idea that goods
should be distributed to individuals on the basis of their relative claims. See ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V 3 (J.A.K. Thompson trans. 1955). His ideas still serve as a
crucible into which modem craftsmen continue to pour problems of a contemporary era
and provide the framework for examining different conceptions of justice. John Rawls, for
example, asserts equality for all, both in the basic liberties of social life and in the
distribution of all forms of social goods, subject only to the exception that inequalities may
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such a uniform application of rules makes meaning only where the
participants stand on an equal footing. The other criterion is that the IEO
should allow for change at a more measured pace while preserving national
2
sovereignties."
The WTO's principles of fair competition and non-discrimination
translate into the abolition of trade preferences and the erosion the General
System of Preferences (GSP). Africa must now trade with others on an equal
footing; yet, an equal treatment of unequal economies perpetuates economic
inequality. 1 3 Most trade agreements contain the Most Favored Nation
(MFN) principle, whereby every trading member nation agrees to provide all
other members with tariff treatment that is, at least, as favorable as that
provided to the "most favored" nation;" 4 but GATT 1947 allowed
developing countries greater freedom to use restrictive trade policies. It
contained the infant industry protection, allowing for the removal of tariff
concessions or the use of quotas, if necessary, to establish an industry in a
developing country and providing for the compensation of any countries
negatively affected.15 It also contained a balance-of-payments protection,
allowing a nation to impose trade measures to safeguard its balance of
payments. 116 In contrast to the infant industry protection, surveillance and
approval procedures proved less burdensome, and affected countries did not
need compensation. Not surprisingly, no country has invoked the infant
industry provisions of the GATT since 1967, though numerous countries
have made use of balance-of-payments protection procedures.
The balance-of-payments protection was revised in the Uruguay Round
and surveillance procedures were tightened. The WTO members must now
publicly announce time schedules for the removal of restrictive import
measures taken for balance of payments purposes and must, in principle, use
price-based measures, such as tariffs. Rules of origin, which the GATT 1947
also implicitly permitted, 1 7 are not currently restricted by any specific terms
of the GATT 1994. Rules of origin permit states to determine the
"nationality" of a product by distinguishing between different
foreign

be permitted if they produce the greatest possible benefit for those least well off in a given
scheme of inequality. Although Rawls does not espouse egalitarianism, he rejects basic
structures that incorporate arbitrary inequalities. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60,

302-03 (1971).
112. See STIGLITZ, supra note 61, at 247.
113. See Dunoff, supra note 97, at 153.
114. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. Ii, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A- 11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
With respect to . . . charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation or exportation . . . any advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
othe country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.

Id.

115. Id. arts. XVIJI.a & XVIII.c.
116. Id. art. XVIII.b.
117. Id. art. XXIV.
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sources of a given product.1 1 8 In their applications, it means that any African
state desiring to export its products to the developed countries must show
that most, if not all, of the raw materials used in the manufacture of such
products originate in the country.1 9 These harsh rules work as roadblocks
on the few African countries that attempt to diversify into manufacturing for
exports.
Rules of origin also exclude African goods from preferences to which
they are entitled. Satisfying these rules involves costs and reduces the extent
to which the preferences raise actual returns, aside from the costs and
120
If the
difficulties associated with providing necessary documentation.
international
in
meeting
Africa
to
assist
want
industrial countries sincerely
standards, they ought to provide resources that would enable the Continent to
comply with such requirements on a voluntary basis, rather than impose
standards that cannot be met for lack of resources. The same argument goes
for the WTO; as George Soros persuasively argues: "Instead of introducing a
rule in the WTO prohibiting child labor, we ought to provide the resources
for universal primary education. We could then demand that the recipients
'' 2
of support eliminate child labor as a condition of receiving that support. '
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing also mandated the elimination
of global textile and apparel quotas by the end of December 2004 (now a part
of history). Yet, an accelerated phasing-out of quotas harms Africa, as most
countries in the Continent already enjoy some quota-free access to some
Western markets through Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) schemes.
The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)-EU economic cooperation has
been up and running since 1975122 and integral to this cooperation was the
principle of non-reciprocity. Under this principle, the EU offers preferential
conditions for access to its markets for products originating in the ACP
states, without a corresponding requirement for reciprocal concession.
Deemed contrary to WTO rules, these preferences are being phased out
under the Cotonou Trade Agreement of 2000.123 The argument is that these
118. John Coyle, Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign Economic Policy: An
Analysis of the Integrated Sourcing Initiative in the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 545, 548 (2004); Bernard Hoekman, Rules of Originfor
Goods and Services, J.WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1993, at 81, 82.
119. See, e.g., Bernard Hoekman, Rules of origin for goods and services: conceptual
issues and economic considerations, CEPR DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 821 (1993),

available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP821 asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
120. See, e.g., UNCTAD, Improving Market Access for Least Developed Countries,
UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/4, at 14 (2001), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
poditctncd4.en.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
121. GEORGE SOROS ON GLOBALIZATION 37 (2002).
122. See generally Dominique David, 40 Years of Europe-ACPRelationship, ACP-EU
COURIER, Sept. 2000, at 11.
123. Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member
States, of the other part art. 36, June 23, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3 [hereinafter Cotonou
Agreement]. For an analysis of the Agreement and its implications for Africa, see
Nsongurua J. Udombana, Back to Basics: The ACP-EU Cotonou Trade Agreement and
Challengesfor the Africa Union, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 57 (2004).
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preferences, being non-reciprocal, cannot qualify. under' Article XXIV of
GATT 1994. They are also considered discriminatory, being extended to a
particular group of developing countries and, therefore, not covered by Part
IV of GATT 1994.
The Cotonou Agreement, however, provides ACP states with an
extension of existing non-reciprocal preferential access for certain ACP
agricultural and other goods to the EU market for an interim period of eight
years. 124 This concession was allowed to enable "ACP countries [to] build
their capacities to withstand freer trade. 125 The Agreement also recognized
that the development of most ACP countries depends heavily on the
preferential arrangements governing the access, at guaranteed prices, of
commodities - in particular bananas, rice and sugar - to the EU market.
Under the Cotonou Agreement, these preferences will be phased out at the
end of this transition period; meaning that after 2008, the ACP countries and
EU will begin a two-way free trade arrangement that conforms to WTO
rules. 12 6 When that happens, when the remaining hope of a lifeline for
developing countries disappears, the international trade becomes a game of
survival of the fittest.
WTO rules place institutional demands and burdens on developing
countries in many ways and these rules cover a variety of new areas services, standards, and intellectual property. New rules require constant
negotiation and agreement to govern the conduct of international trade.
Implementing them requires additional institutional capacity on the part of
member governments, which is presently lacking in Africa and other
developing countries. 127 Second, negotiations on the liberalization of various
sectors require continuous participation by the members and, again,
developing countries lack the institutional capacities to engage in these long
28
and drawn out negotiations. 1
4.

The Damocles of Subsidy and Protectionism

The "supply side" constraints to trade in Africa are compounded by
"the disgraceful protectionism" that Africa faces in the markets of the
developed world and the need to compete with heavily subsidized developed
country exports. The industrial countries are not committed to reciprocity in
tariff reduction but use subsidies to obstruct Africa's optimization of world
trade. Whereas African farmers fight under cruel disadvantages, their

124. Cotonou Agreement, supra note 123, art. 36(3).
125. Int'l Cent. For Trade and Sustainable Dev., EU, ACP Agree to New Trade and Aid
Accord, BRIDGES, Feb. 8, 2000, available at http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/story2.0802-O0.htm (last visited July 27, 2005).
126. For a discussion of these and related issues, see Matthew McQueen, ACP-EU
Trade Cooperation after 2000: An Assessment of Reciprocal Trade Preferences, 36 J.
MOD. AFRI. STUD. 669 (1998).

127. MICHALOPOULOS, supra note 80, at 3.
128. Id.
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Western counterparts enjoy all forms of direct and indirect subsidies from
their governments. In rationalizing.the global protests over globalization that
began in Seattle, Stiglitz explains:
While these [advanced] countries had preached - and forced - the opening
of the markets in the developing countries to their industrial products, they had
continued to keep their markets closed to the products of the developing
countries, such as textiles and agriculture. While they preached that
developing countries should not subsidize their industries, they continued to
provide billions in subsidies to their
129 own farmers, making it impossible for the
developing countries to compete.
Commentators like Alan Sykes do not believe that a subsidy arises each
time a government program benefits the private actors. Such a suggestion,
according to him, "ignores the other side of the ledger - the numerous
government programs that impose costs on those same actors. 1'' 3 °
In principle, the WTO is expected to eliminate most subsidies on
grounds that they are trade distorting and protectionist. In practice, rich
countries get away with un-free trade and craftily win exemptions for various
forms of subsidies that they use, while prohibiting those that developing
countries apply. The EU spends nearly half of its collective budget on the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), typically in the form of subsidies. 3'
Sugar provisions in the CAP have led to overproduction, with excess sugar
from European countries "end[ing] up in places such as Algeria, Ghana,
Congo and Indonesia, displacing sugar produced in countries such as South
Africa and India."'' 32 On October 15, 2004, the WTO Panel found the
European Communities (EC) in breach of their obligations under the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture,1 33 by exporting more than three times the level of
quantity commitments they had made and for exporting export subsidies to
exports of ACP/India equivalent imports. 134 The Panel recommended that
the EC sugar regime should be brought into conformity with Agreement on

129. STIGLITZ, supra note 61, at 244.
130. Alan Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER No. 186 (2D Series) 3
(2003),
available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprsI 76-200/
186.aos.subsidies.pdf (last visited July 27, 2005).
131. Richard Ebbs, Global Finance or Economic Crimes Against Humanity? (July 4,
2002) (unpublished essay), available at http://www.feedback.nildram.co.uk/richardebbs/
essays/gfinance.htm (last visited July 27, 2005). Cf Jonathan Derrick, The World's Unfair
Trade, AFR. ToPics 9, 10 (Jan.- Mar. 2000) (stressing that the EU's subsidies to
agriculture under CAP and to exports "have meant that it is an unfair competitor with the
developing world for exports of many products and even undercuts local producers on
domestic markets").
132. Oh, Sweet Reason, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 2004, at 73. See also Kevin
Watkins, Dumping on the World: How EU Sugar Policies Hurt Poor Countries, OXFAM
BRIEFING PAPER 61, Mar. 2004, at 1 et seq.
133. See Agreement on Agriculture, April 15, 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legal-e/1 4-ag.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
134. See WTO PANEL, EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - EXPORT SUBSIDIES ON SUGAR -

COMPLAINT BY AUSTRALIA, WTO Doc. 04-4209,

8.1 (d)&(f) and 8.3 (Oct. 15, 2004).
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Agriculture 135 and that it should also "consider measures to bring its
production of sugar more in line with domestic consumption whilst fully
respecting its international commitments with respect to imports, including
its commitments to developing countries."1' 36 The WTO Appellate Body
upheld the Panel's report on April 28, 2005;137 but, if precedent is anything
to go by, it is unlikely that these decisions will impel the EC to change an
institution that is bent on preserving the quaint lifestyles of uncompetitive
farmers.
The United States is not any better; rather, "[i]ts ways of asserting
economic power at the developing countries' expense are sometimes worse
than the EU's."' 3 8 The country has subsidized agricultural exports for years
and regularly renegotiates its sugar import quotas, which it could alter
unilaterally. 39 In 2002, Congress reportedly passed a farm bill allocating an
additional $190 billion in subsidies over a ten-year period; two-thirds of that
sum went to farmers
growing export crops, such as wheat, soybeans, corn,
40
1
rice.
and
cotton,
Like the EU and United States, the OECD is gregarious in supporting
subsidies in member countries. Its trade policy is "to support... the
multilateral system through objective, fact-based analysis and dialogue on a
wide range of trade policy issues. It seeks to strengthen the constituency for
free trade, build bridges among stakeholders on sensitive issues, and
facilitate WTO negotiations.' 4' The practice of OECD betrays this policy.
A recent World Bank study shows that "[s]ubsidies in OECD countries
amount to US$330 billion - of which some US$250 billion goes directly to
producers.' 4 2
The negative effects of subsidies in developing countries are
substantial, given the sheer size of subsidies relative to the size of the
market. Cotton subsidies in the United States and the EU stand at about $4.4
billion annually, in a $20 billion market! 143 For many African countries
where cotton accounts for more than one-third of their export earnings Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad - the losses are huge; indeed, West African
cotton exporters lose about $250 million a year as a direct result of United
States subsidies.' 44 Northern subsidy of coffee and the corresponding

135. Seeid. 8.5.

136. Id. 8.7.
137. See WTO APPELLATE BODY, ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES -EXPORT SUBSIDIES ON
SUGAR, AB-2005-2, WTO Doc. 05-1728, 346(d)&(f) (April 28, 2005).

138. Derrick, supra note 131, at 10.
139. Id.
140. Global Exchange, Food Security, Fanning, and the FTAA and WTO, (Oct. 2003),
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/wto/FTAAWTOAgriculture.html (last visited
July 27, 2005).
141. OECD Web site, http://www.oecd.org.
142. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2004: REALIZING THE
DEVELOPMENT PROMISE OF THE DOHA AGENDA xvii (2003) [hereinafter GLOBAL
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2004].
143. See Aksoy, supra note 102, at 3.
144. See Ebbs, supra note 131.
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decline in global prices at the beginning of the millennium cost Ethiopia - 1 45a
country that started coffee production - $300 million in export revenues.
The loss represented a fifty percent decline 1in
the country's annual export
46
earnings and led to household food shortages.
In all, subsidies upset the market access expectations associated with
trade agreements; they "lead recipients to reduce prices and expand
output; ' 147 they inhibit entry by inducing procyclical surplus production by
noncompetitive, often large, producers; and they "stimulate overproduction
in high-cost rich countries and shut out potentially more competitive
products from poor countries."' 148 Agricultural subsidies have particularly
worsened global income distribution, with farmers in industrial countries
earning more, on average, than the national income average,14 9in contrast to
the very low income of rural farmers in developing countries.
Protection is another major barrier to trade. While African and other
developing countries blindly reform their trade policies and practices and
implement the Uruguay Round commitments, developed countries openly
refuse to yield any meaningful ground in terms of a reduction in protection.
The United States regards domestic policies in other countries as barriers to
its market access and, hence, "inappropriate" in areas it has a competitive
disadvantage; 150 but it continues to retain the benefits of its antidumping
laws, which it could invoke for protection against low cost imports. The
resurgence of protectionism by the developed countries,15' through dirty
tariffication, is costing developing countries over $700 million annually from
losses in export earnings."5
Protectionism is also a major contributor to the public health crisis in
Africa, particularly in the area of H1V-AIDS scourge. The United States
trade policy and pharmaceutical patent protection in Africa have ensured that
most HV-infected persons go untreated due to the prohibitive costs of AIDS
drugs. Meanwhile, many African states do not have laws that protect local
industries; where they do, such laws are rarely invoked against the North.
The avalanche of multinational corporations operating in developing
145. See Celine Charveriat, Bitter Coffee: How the Poor are Payingfor the Slump in
Coffee Prices, OXFAM POLICY PAPER, May 2001, at 1, 3-4, available at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we-do/issues/trade/downloads/bittercoffee.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 5, 2005).
146. See id.
147. Sykes, supra note 130, at 7 (noting further that "[s]uch behavior by a subsidized
firm will attract customers away from unsubsidized firms").
148. GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2004, supra note 142, at xvii. See generally
Warren Schwartz & Eugene Harper, Jr., The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting
InternationalTrade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1972).
149. See Aksoy, supra note 102, at 20-21.
150. See Howse, supra note 98, at 101.
151. See Algiers Declaration, supra note 85. Cf. Pascal Lamy, Hong Kong Ministerialis
Last and Best Chance to Conclude the Round by Next Year, Remarks at the International
Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF (Sept. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl e/sppl03_e.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005)
("[M]ake no mistake, signs of resurgent protectionism are all too evident.").
152. See Derrick, supra note 131, at 11 (citing study estimates by Oxfam).
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countries makes internal regulation of markets by African countries
particularly difficult, if not impossible.
In 1997, the South African
Government attempted to enact a domestic legislation to allow for
compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals.
About forty multinationaldominated pharmaceutical companies took the government to court, arguing
that its action violated TRIPS.' 53 (The suit was dropped in 2001 only due to
bad publicity.) 15 4 The fact is that TRIPS permits such measures; 55 Articles
31 and 2:1 of TRIPS, read in conjunction with Article 5.A.2 of the Paris
Convention, clearly provide authority for the issuance of compulsory
licenses.' 56 The real problem is that most multinationals operating in Africa
are more powerful than their host governments and are capable of
destabilizing or, at least, holding these governments hostage at will. "Every
African57 government," says Julius Ihonvbere, "has reason to watch its
,

back."'

Sadly, the WTO system has been unable to check these trends towards
omnipotence by industrial countries. Instead, the organization has taken
away the gains that developing countries had in GATT 1947 - through
painful negotiations - allowing governments, inter alia, to impose
antidumping and countervailing duties and safeguard measures.
The
Agreement on Agriculture, in particular, has tied the "hands" of African
countries, preventing them from protecting themselves against dumping the selling of products in another country below the cost of production- by
Western countries. By providing SDT in favor of developed countries, the
market access pillar of the Agreement on Agriculture is as incomprehensible
as it is insensitive to the large number of people living in poverty in
Africa. 1 58 Absent this Agreement, African countries could put up their tariffs
to defend themselves and their peoples against some highly subsidized

153. See Sarah Boseley, At the Mercy of Drug Giants: Millions Struggle with Disease
as PharmaceuticalFirms Go to Court to Protect Profits, GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 2001,
available at www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4134799,00.html (last visited
Sept. 10, 2005) (reporting that approximately forty pharmaceutical companies were
engaged in a legal challenge to § 15(c) of South Africa's 1997 Medicines Act).
154. See Karen DeYoung, Makers of AIDS Drugs Drop S.Africa Suit, WASH. POST,
Apr. 19, 2001, at A13 (reporting that the world's major pharmaceutical companies planned
to drop their suit against the South African Government due to the "public relations
nightmare").
155. See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address
Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 71, 72 (2001) (arguing that the
TRIPS Agreement "manifestly permits governments to authorize... compulsory
licenses").
156. Id. at 74.
157. JULIUS
0.
IHONVBERE,
ECONOMIC
CRISIS,
CIVIL
SOCIETY,
AND
DEMOCRATIZATION: THE CASE OF ZAMBIA 224 (1996).
158. Cf Gonzalez, supra note 100, at 436 n. 11 ("While the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture did not create the inequitable economic relations between industrialized and
developing countries .... it exacerbates the asymmetries and may limit the options
available to developing countries to promote food security.").
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imports; but with this Agreement, African markets are flooded unchecked
with manufactured goods that the impoverished people of the continent
cannot buy.
Like the WTO, the IMF maintains a strong institutional position against
exchange restrictions, including antidumping measures and taxes on trade,
restrictions it regards as indicative of inadequate exchange rate policies. 59
Although the IMF defines exchange restrictions in a limited fashion - for
purposes of its jurisdiction 16 0 - its conditionality covers a wide scope of
economic and financial policies that often extends to liberalization of trade
measures. The IMF's standard condition for continued receipt of financing
requires members to refrain from imposing or intensifying import restrictions
Trade restrictions may invite
for balance-of-payments reasons.16 1
surveillance as giving rise to fiscal imbalances or, more generally, indicate
poor macroeconomic policies. 162 Since it is the "power of the purse" that
often drives governmental decisions, developing countries stand to lose more
from such stringent conditionality. Developing countries need funds more
than industrial countries and, therefore, are more pliable to IMF conditions.
5.

World Trade Accentuates Poverty in Africa

The WTO ties the domestic goals of full employment, poverty
reduction, and social stability to the international trading system. This is
based on the belief that economic growth through free trade leads to greater
promotion and protection of human rights, particularly the right to
development. The WTO even praises itself for offering a range of benefits to
humanity, "[firom the money in our pockets and the goods and services that
we use, to a more peaceful world."1 63 Yet, it is difficult to reconcile this
paradisiacal portrait with the fact that most indices measuring the quality of
life and human development show worsening conditions in Africa and many
other developing countries.
More than half of Africa's population still lives on a less-than-a-dollara-day threshold; NEPAD laments that "340 million people, or half the
population, live on less than U.S. $1 per day" at the turn of the
millennium. 164 Africa's share of people living in absolute poverty in the
world is higher than any other region; likewise the ratio of income to poverty
line; and about fifty percent of the poor in SSA are concentrated in five

159. See, e.g., Decision No. 5392-(77/63) (Apr. 29, 1977), SELECTED DECISIONS, supra
note 73, at 10 (discussing surveillance over exchange rate policies).
160. According to the IMF, "The guiding principle in ascertaining whether a measure is
a restriction on payments and transfers for current transactions under Article VIII, Section
2, is whether it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of
exchange as such." Decision No. 1034-(60/27), para. 1 (June 1, 1960), SELECTED
DECISIONS, supra note 73, at 428.
161. See, e.g., the standard form for stand-by arrangements, SELECTED DECISIONS,
supra note 73, at 171.
162. See Siegel, supra note 47, at 566.
163. 10 BENEFITS OF THE WTO TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 54, at 1.
164. NEPAD, supra note 99, para. 4.
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countries of East Africa and Nigeria!1 65 The continent's
poverty stands in
166
stark contrast to the prosperity of the developed world.
It is true that not all poverty related suffering is due to neo-liberalism
- the belief that market forces, not governments, should regulate the global
economy - and that "[p]overty-related suffering might have much more to
do with the extremely corrupt, often genocidal political leadership in the
least developed countries than with international economic policies. ' 167
Nevertheless, the global economic disorder has compounded Africa's efforts
at economic self-reliance, "measured by reductions in the ratio of imports to
total supply of particular goods and services, and of foreign factors of
production to total factors employed."' 168 The living standards of Africans
have been declining, which occurs when public welfare is subordinated to
private profit and when, in the scathing words of Frank Garcia, "those
already holding an unequal share of the world's natural and social resources
continue to receive an unequal share of the gains from trade. 169
Countries most adversely affected by free trade are the LDCs. Africa
accounts for 34 of the 49 currently classified,1 70 representing 69.39 percent
of the total. Of the thirty-four African LDCs, twenty-five or 73.53 percent
are in the WTO, while two others - Ethiopia and Sudan - are in the
process of accession to the body. 17 1 The common denominators among the
LDCs are rising debts, falling commodity prices, and sharp declines in
development aid and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), leading to poverty.
The LDCs constitute fifteen percent of the world's population but almost
twenty-four percent of the world's poor, with eighty-two percent of them
living in rural areas. 172 Nearly three-fifths of the population of SSA lives in
the LDCs, with abject poverty as their lot. Surely,173a more equitable lEO can
contribute towards making people less miserable.

165. AU COMMISSION, AFRICA, OUR COMMON DESTINY: GUIDELINE DOCUMENT 8
(2004) [hereinafter OUR COMMON DESTINY].

166. Id. at 7.
167. See Andras Sajo, Socioeconomic Rights and the InternationalEconomic Order,35
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221 (2002).
168. Douglas Rimmer, Book Review, 96(385) AFRI. AFFAIRS 618, 618 (1997)
(reviewing R. OMOTAYO OLANIYAN, FOREIGN AID, SELF-RELIANCE, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA (1996)).

169. Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing
World, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 975, 976-77 (2000).
170. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, STATISTICAL
PROFILES OF THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 5, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/Misc.72

(2001) [hereinafter UNCTAD/LDC].
171. The African LDCs in WTO are Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Chad, DR Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. WTO, Enhancing Trade Opportunities,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist-e/min03_e/brief_e/brief20_e.htm (last visited
Sept. 10, 2005).
172. See Aksoy, supra note 102, at 17, 18.
173. See Sajo, supra note 167, at 222.
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Northern Initiativesand Hypocrisies on Africa's Development

Africa's development crisis has become part of industrial countries'
agendas at their annual G8 summits, which have produced avalanches of
commitments to assist the continent. The most recent of such summits was
the July 2005 Gleneagles Summit in England, which was nearly marred by
the terrorist attacks in London. 174 Its main agenda was how to end poverty in
Africa and it ended with an agreement to boost aid for developing countries
by $50 billion (£28.8bn). 17' The industrial countries have also employed
SDT as key elements in their efforts to assist the integration of the LDCs into
the world economy. 176 Notable amongst these trade preferences are the
7
Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative of the EU 17 and the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA), enacted into law in the United States as part
of the Trade and Development Act of 2000.178 The EBA regulation grants
duty-free access to imports of all products from the LDCs, with the
exception of arms and munitions, and without any quantitative restrictions.
Such duty-free access aims to significantly enhance export opportunities and,
hence, potential income and growth for these countries. The initiative,
however, excludes three products - fresh bananas, rice, and sugar - where
tariffs will be gradually reduced to zero (2006 for bananas and 2009 for rice
and sugar).
The AGOA, on its part, is the latest in a series of regional initiatives in
United States trade policy. It is a part of the "post-Cold War constructive reengagement" in Africa and is based on the philosophy that trade, not aid, is
179
The AGOA, which
the chief tool for promoting economic development.
was first proposed at the height of the banana trade wars between the United

174. See Steve Schifferes, London Bombs Make G8 Impact, BBC NEWS ONLINE, July 8,
2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4662679.stm (last visited July 13,

2005).
175. See G8 Leaders Agree $50bn Aid Boost, BBC NEWS ONLINE, July 8, 2005,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/4662297.stm (last visited July 13, 2005)
(reporting that the debt of the eighteen poorest nations in Africa is also being cancelled,
and a commitment by the G8 to work towards cutting subsidies and tariffs).
176. For a critique of SDT in international trade, see Michael Hart & Bill Dymond,
Special and Differential Treatment and the Doha "Development" Round, 37 J. WORLD
TRADE 395, 395 (2003) (deeming as "misguided and perverse" the theory that the
economies of developing countries require sheltering from full application of liberalized
trade rules; and arguing that differential trade treatment is "more likely to retard than aid
economic development").
177. See Joe Kirwin, U.S., EU, Japan, Canada to Expand, Speed Up Concessions for
PoorCountries, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 22, at 847 (May 31, 2001).
178. See Trade and Development Act of 2000 (African Trade Bill), 19 U.S.C.
§ 3702(l),(4),(5) (2000), 2001 O.J. (L60) [hereinafter AGOA]. For a description, see U.S.
Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, Second Annual Report, USITC Pub. 3476,
at 15-21 (Dec. 2001).
179. See Brown, supra note 22, at 862 n. 231 (stressing: "This shift in U.S. foreign aid
thinking, with its insistence on self-reliance, governmental reform, and adoption of free
trade policies, contrasts sharply with the more traditional foreign aid and development
paradigm outlined in the Lome Convention").

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:1153

States and the EU 180 - though the United States does not produce bananas,
181offers trade preferences to the beneficiary countries as a complement to
foreign aid. It expands the scope of preferences in such key areas as clothing
and encourages the beneficiary countries to adopt reforms in their economic,
investment, and trade policies. AGOA is aimed, more specifically, at
encouraging increased trade and investment between the United States and
sub-Saharan Africa; negotiating reciprocal and mutually beneficial trade
agreements, including the possibility of establishing free trade areas that
serve the interests of both the United States and the countries of SSA; and
focusing on countries committed
to the rule of law, economic reform, and the
82
eradication of poverty.'
To be fair, the SDT has brought some marginal gains to Africa. The
2002 U.S. Report on AGOA notes that "U.S. imports from [SSA] have
increased 61.5 percent over the last two years, 183 though it glossed over the
fact that these imports declined by 9.3 percent during 2001.184 The trouble is
that even such modest gains come at the expense of other African countries
that are penalized by the discrimination. Besides, most of the SDT contains
restrictive conditions on terms of market access, such as the application of
rules of origin. The EBA stipulates that vessels must be at least fifty percent
owned by nationals of the beneficiary country, the EU, or by companies with
a head office in either the beneficiary or an EU state of which the chairman
85
and the majority of the board members are nationals of those countries.
Preferences under the EBA are of no real value to several LDCs
because nearly all exports are concentrated in products for which the EU
external tariff is zero. The key issue for these countries is the extent to
which the EU scheme of preferences can assist in stimulating diversification
into a broader range of exports. In general, the promises of a better life for
180. See Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, Decision By
the Arbitrators, WT/DS27/ARB (April 9, 1999).
181. See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, Racing US. Foreign Policy 17 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 23
(2003) ("Not a single banana is grown in the United States and thus this dispute is to
protect American capital, not American jobs.").
182. See AGOA, supra note 178, § 103(1).
183. See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), 2002 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
ON U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT (2002) 1
[hereinafter USTR 2002 AGOA REPORT].
184. Id. at 24. See generally UNCTAD, The African Growth and Opportunity Act: A
Preliminary
Assessment,
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/1,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsb2003l-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2005) (offering
an early assessment of the utility of the AGOA tariff preferences as an instrument of SDT
for the beneficiary countries).
185. See Paul Brenton, Integrating the Least Developed Countries into the World
Trading System: The Current Impact of EU Preferences under Everything But Arms,
WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 3018, at 24 (Apr. 2003) (evaluating
the impact of the EBA initiative on LDCs' exports and showing that changes introduced
by the EBA in 2001 are relatively minor, primarily because over 99 percent of EU imports
from the LDCs are in products which the EU had already liberalized and the complete
removal of barriers to the key remaining products, rice, sugar and bananas has been
delayed).
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Africa have never quite materialized because of insincerity on the part of the
promisors. Donor nations often use their sunshine SDT schemes to
blackmail or coerce Africa and other developing countries into accepting
their dictations during trade negotiations. The defunct OAU hinted at such
duplicity on the part of donor nations when it declared in 1999:
While expressing satisfaction at the various co-operation initiatives and
approaches in favour of Africa, we reaffirm our readiness and willingness to
promote, with all our partners, a genuine partnership devoid of any selfish
calculationsfor influence; a partnership that respects the unity of the continent
and aims at the development of Africa, rather than using it as a mere reservoir

that
enables Africa to achieve its integration, ensure its development for the benefit
of its peoples and occupy its rightful place on the international scene for the
mutual and inclusive benefit of the International Community as a whole.186
of raw materials and market for manufactured goods; a partnership

Critics have also argued that AGOA was more an attempt by the United
States to address WTO concerns over the former's perceived foreign policy
inconsistencies toward Africa than a genuine and informed domestic African
foreign policy framework reassessment. 187 The post-AGOA United States'
policies towards Africa and other developing countries appear to give
The Bush administration is reportedly
credence to such criticisms.
committed to withholding some concessions on the importation of textiles
promised to African and Caribbean countries.' 88 European countries, on
their parts, always threaten to veto any modest trade proposal to change farm
policies in favor of developing countries. 18 9 Such actions shortchange Africa
in every conceivable way. As Stiglitz cries out, "so unfair has the trade
agenda been that not only have the poorer countries not received a fair share
actually made
of the benefits; the poorest region in the world, [SSA], was
' 190
worse off as a result of the last round of trade negotiations."
It is the height of hypocrisy for the North to continue to use its
dominance in the WTO and power politics to block welfare increasing trade
liberalization for the South. Such actions go to show that "when the crunch
comes it is governed by the reality that states have no principles, only
Yet, such doublespeak poses grave threats to future
interests. ' '
Development Rounds, as the Cancun debacle demonstrated.

186. Algiers Declaration, supra note 85 (emphasis added).
187. See, e.g., Hunter R. Clark, African "Renaissance": and U.S. Trade Policy, 27 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265, 283 (1999) (noting that the real impetus for the shift in U.S.
foreign policy toward Africa stemmed from a congressional directive to address the
WTO's criticisms in a concrete legislative initiative). See also Brown, supra note 22, at
864.
188. See GEORGE SOROS, supra note 121, at 34.
189. Cap It All, THE ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 16.
190. STIGLITZ, supra note 61, at 245.
191. Trotman, supra note 67, at 22.
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II.

EXAMINING THE NATURE OF WTO REMEDIES
The last Part attempted to establish that Africa has been greatly
chanced in the game of free trade, given that the rules of the game are
anything but free. In general, rules usually contain sanctions for breaches;
and the WTO system is no exception. This Part examines the effectiveness
of the WTO remedies for breaches of international trade obligations. It
argues that, although the WTO has succeeded in creating a system in which
asymmetry in countries' sizes does not affect the outcome of a dispute, it
remains a series of biases affecting the performance of developing countries.
A.

An Outline of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding

The rules and procedures governing the WTO dispute resolution are
formalized in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).19 2 Given the
breadth of WTO membership, the DSU is the most extensive network of
compulsory dispute settlement systems in contemporary international law. It
replaces the GATT dispute settlement system, which has been described as
"the history of improvising on the extremely inadequate language of Article
XXIII [of the GATT], which concerns remedies for 'nullification and
impairment' of negotiated liberalization commitments."'' 93 Its twenty-seven
articles create a two-tiered trade dispute settlement, utilizing consultations
between the parties, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. As Kim der
Borght observes, "[tihe DSU changed the nature of the dispute settlement
process from a diplomatic to a legalized process and from a power-based to a
rule-based procedure."' 94 The DSU is the backbone of the multilateral
trading system. Its rules were legalized in order to enforce the substantive
rules of the WTO agreements, with the potential to constrain members,
particularly the powerful ones, from engaging in unilateral or rule-breaking
95
behavior.
At the center of the DSU is the arrangement for referring disputes to
panels made up of independent experts, whose role resembles that of
arbitrators. Panel reports form part of the WTO acquis; and though not
legally binding precedents, they exercise a considerable influence on later
panels.196 There is a right of appeal to the Appellate Body,' 97 established in
192. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 [hereinafter
DSU], in LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 24, at 354; 33 I.L.M. 114.

193. JOHN H. JACKSON, GATT MACHINERY AND THE TOKYO ROuND AGREEMENTS
(1983), quoted in JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 333 (2d ed., 1986).
194. Kim Van der Borght, The Review of the WTO Understanding on Dispute
Settlement: Some Reflections on the CurrentDebate, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1223, 1224

(1999).
195. See Robert 0. Keohane et. al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and
INT'L ORG. 457 (2000); JOHN JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT
SYSTEM 56-80 (1990).
196. For a discussion, see David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal
System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 398 (1998).
197. See DSU, supra note 192, art. 16.
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1995. The Appellate Body is a standing body of seven persons that reviews
panel reports' 98 and addresses possible errors in misinterpreting the law, a
development that was "unique and unprecedented.., in international
trade."' 199 It can uphold, modify, or reverse panel reports and the parties to
the dispute must accept Appellate Body Reports once adopted. Statistically,
approximately 114 of the WTO disputes have resulted in the adoption of
eighty-seven Panel Reports and fifty-six Appellate Body Reports, in "just
'2 °°
under 25,000 pages ofjurisprudence.
Like the GATT before it, the DSU is based on the notion of the
"nullification or impairment" of benefits, rather than breach of WTO
obligations. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) recommends what steps
should be taken to end the dispute and gives a ruling authorizing the
complainant to suspend WTO obligations with respect to the respondent
member. 201 Countermeasures, retaliations, and reprisals are strictly regulated
202
and can take place only within the framework of the DSU, and the amount
of retaliation shall be equivalent to the amount of harm suffered as a result of
the illegal action.20 3 The next segment examines the extent to which the
DSU has been effective in stemming trade breaches.
B. Assessing the Effectiveness of the DSU
In principle, the DSU facilitates multilateral approval for punitive
measures and gives rich and poor countries alike equal rights to challenge
each other. It underscores the rule of law and makes the trading system more
secure and predictable. Its rationale is that a trade agreement of the WTO
type can succeed only if it includes scope for enforcement which,
theoretically, ensures that each country receives all the benefits for which it
negotiated and that no country is required to make concessions to which it
has not agreed. 204 Although the DSU is based on the system of dispute
settlement set out in Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the
fundamental political nature of both systems are identical, its mechanism is
stronger. The procedure under GATT 1947 had no fixed timetables, rulings
2 5
Under
were easier to block, and many cases dragged on inconclusively.
198. Id. art. 17.
199. Patrick Specht, The Dispute Settlement Systems of GATT and NAFTA-Analysis
and Comparison,27 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 517, 580 (1998).
200. John H. Jackson, The ChangingFundamentalsof InternationalLaw and Ten Years
of the WTO, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 3, 5 (2005).
201. See, e.g., GATS, supra note 95, art. XXIII. See also JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN
LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND
PROCEEDURES 100 (1999).
202. See generally ELAGAB OMER YOUSSiF, THE LEGALITY OF NON-FORCIBLE
COUNTER-MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988).

203. See DSU, supra note 192, art. 22.
204. See John Ragosta et al., WTO Dispute Settlement: The System is Flawed and Must
be Fixed, 37 INT'L LAW. 697, 698 (2003).
205. See generally Thomas Schoenbaun, WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and
Suggestionsfor Reform, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 647 (1998); DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds., 1998); ERNSTULRICH

PETERSMANN,

THE

GATT/WTO

DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT

SYSTEM:
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the DSU, one party to a dispute can no longer block the establishment of a
dispute settlement panel and the adoption of a panel report, unless all
members of the DSU agree by consensus not to adopt it. 20 6 There are now
strict time schedules, intended to enhance timely compliance with procedural
requirements and, thus, address the question of unnecessary delays and
deadlocks in the resolution of trade disputes.2 °7
There is also evidence of expansive judicial law-making by the
Appellate Body, which increasingly clarifies ambiguities and fills in gaps in
the GATT and WTO agreements,20 8 though such "activism" is not without
criticisms.209 The essential question relates to the effectiveness of the DSU
enforcement mechanism. To what extent does the DSU ensure compliance
with its decisions and provide compensation for damages? These are
legitimate questions, because disputes are essentially about broken promises
and the mechanism for settling such disputes gains legitimacy as parties to it
comply - and the mechanism itself ensures compliance - with its
decisions.
1.

The Question of Transparencyin the DeliberativeProcessesof the DSB

The first problem with the WTO dispute mechanism is that much of the
deliberative processes of the DSB, like the WTO structure itself, are
shrouded in secrecy. Some commentators, in a near irrational exuberance,
have attempted to defend this secrecy on "several sound reasons." One
reason is that such secrecy shields "the adjudicator from outside pressures
and from the passions of the day that do not relate to the merits of the legal
issues pending before the court., 2'0 Another reason is that "[a]ny more
transparency than what already exists in the deliberative process of these
bodies would threaten the integrity of the WTO dispute settlement
process.,,21 Both points may be correct, but neither is compelling, let alone

INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
AND
DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT(1997); Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing

Their Sovereign Rights? The GA TiT Dispute Settlement Process in a GlobalizedEconomy,
4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161 (1996); Special Issue: WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1
J. INT'L ECON. L. 2 (1998); and Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism-Coverage and Procedures of the WTO understanding,29 J. WORLD TRADE

5 (1995).
206. DSU, supranote 192, art. 16.
207. Id. art. 4(3) (reply to request for consultations to be within ten days); art. 4(7)
(sixty days for the successful completion of consultations); art. 20 (time frame for DSU
decisions).

208. See Richard Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,
Constitutional,and PoliticalConstraints,98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 248 (2004).
209. See, e.g., Karl Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 401
(2000) (expressing concern that the WTO DSU is simultaneously generative and insular).

See generally CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE
FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001).

210. Kevin Kennedy, Globalization and Its Discontents, 35(1) GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 251, 260 (2003).

211. Id.
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convincing. These arguments fail to recognize the interest that shapes social
the invisible hand of objective
structures 2 12and legal institutions necessity.

The DSU is constrained by politics and does not operate in isolation; it
interacts regularly with political institutions and processes and the
responsibility of the major industrial players - as legislators - underpins
the system. Richard Steinberg stresses this constraint when he writes:
"[P]owerful WTO members each have a unilateral veto over the selection of
Appellate Body members, and a candidate's approach to judicial decisionmaking figures prominently in those members' decisions on whether to block
a candidacy. 213 Memberships of the DSB, besides being selected, are adhoc and not permanent, which further compromises their independence. The
DSU itself does not contain the procedural protections essential to due
process, equity, and transparency in a binding judicial environment. The
procedural rules governing the panel, arbitration, and appellate body
proceedings receive only passing attention. As John Ragosta and others
argue:
If the agreements were clearly defined, panels could simply determine the facts
and apply the negotiated provision appropriately. But when different parties to
an agreement have differences of opinion about the meaning of a negotiated
provision (much of it intentional, resulting from an inability to reach more
judicial interpretation
precise agreement in the Uruguay Round negotiations),
214
or "construction" becomes almost inevitable.
2.

The Question of Access and Capacity of Developing Countries

Another criticism of the DSU is that its mechanism is largely
countries. 21 5
inaccessible to, and ineffective in the hands of, most developing
Accessing the DSU involves high resource and monetary costs, thus raising
genuine concerns regarding the institutional capacities of developing
countries to benefit from these remedies. Though the DSU enables
developing countries to address their grievances, it poses tremendous strains
in terms of institutional capacities to initiate and sustain actions against more

212. See Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN L. REv. 57, 70-71 (1984). For a
comprehensive critique of objectivist/necessitarian modes of social analysis, see ROBERTO
UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASKS (1987).
213. Steinberg, supranote 208, at 249.
214. Ragosta et al., supra note 204, at 700. Cf Joel Trachtman, The Domain of WTO
Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333 (1999) (explaining the problem in terms of
Dworkinian rules and standards). According to Trachtman, were the applicable legal
provision of the DSU to have the characteristics of a rule--"clear, self-executing, fully
specified in advance ... once the facts are determined," then the dispute resolution process
will have little more to do. Where, however, the legal provision has the characteristics of a
standard, with need of interpretation or even construction, then the determination of the
law and the application of the law to the facts become much more complex. Id. at 337-38.
215. JAWARA & KWA,supra note 1,at 302.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:1153

powerful nations. 2 16 Many aspects of the DSU merely provide the developed
countries with new instruments to put pressure on developing countries in
pursuit of their own commercial agendas.
The DSU also involves interpretations of hundreds of rules, clauses,
sub-clauses, curved and square brackets, and technical jargons that may be
fully understood, if at all, only after hours upon hours of painful study. As
Leroy Trotman argues:
The only parties which may be expected reasonably to understand what each
commitment is under a rule, are those parties who in one way or the other were
involved in the original conceptualization and the subsequent drafting and
development of the enabling legislation. It is they, and sometimes only they,
who know where the escape clauses are and how particular regulations may be
waived or otherwise disregarded to achieve a specific objective for the country
of that party, and who equally know from the first step of the novitiate where
that new club member has gone wrong, where the maze of the regulations will
take the member and how, if at all,217the member may re-emerge with any of
his/her country's sovereignty intact.
There is evidence of a rise in the number of disputes under the DSU,
about 324 complaints since the WTO's inception.2t s Some commentators
attribute this rise to "a broad desire by WTO member states, including
developing and least developing countries as well as the industrial and richer
countries, to utilize this DS procedure presumably to their benefit., 21 9 A
more plausible explanation for the increase might involve the broader scope
of the WTO agreements -

compared to GATT 1947 -

rather than

confidence in the system.22° In any event, most of these disputes involve
Western countries, 22 1 again underscoring the inaccessibility of the DSU to
many developing countries. Of course, the legal debates arising from these
disputes may serve to clarify for the lesser players what pitfalls they should
come to expect.
3.

The Question of Compliancewith Decisions of the DSB

Although the WTO rules are binding in the traditional international law
sense and the DSU "establishes a preference for an obligation to perform the
recommendation," doubts remain regarding whether these rules actually
"nail down" the issue as to the domestic application of obligations
set forth
216. See MICHALOPOULOS, supra note 80, at 3.
217. Trotman, supra note 67, at 20-21.
218. Jackson, supra note 200, at 5.
219. See id. (stressing "Smaller countries have achieved some remarkable successes in
cases brought against large powerful members").
220. See Robert Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure:An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 17 (1999). Contra Sebastiaan
Princen, EC Compliance with WTO Law: The Interplay of Law and Politics, 15 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 555, 556 (2004) (stating that the rise in the number of disputes possible reflects
greater confidence in the DSU system).
221. See, e.g., 9(1) EUR. J. INT'L L. 182 et seq. (1998) (briefly noting some decisions of
WTO Appellate Body, most of them against Western countries-US, Canada, Japan, and
the European Communities).
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therein. 222 Compliance with the DSU is largely the outcome of domestic
political process, though international commitments and developments do
exert an influence on this process.223 The reason, basically, is that the DSU
is a "court without bailiff."
Many theories compete for attention on the potency of the DSU. Some
commentators argue that the mere threat of a ruling tends to induce an early
settlement by a defendant. According to Sebastiaan Princen, "resorting to
formal WTO dispute settlement procedures can be used as a threat. In
addition, states may anticipate adverse legal rulings or threats from other
countries and ensure compliance before a dispute arises. 224 Eric Reinhardt
argues that defendants concede more prior to GATT judgments than
afterwards, despite GATT's lack of enforcement power.225 He develops an
incomplete information model of trade bargaining with the option of
adjudication, according to which the plaintiff has a greater resolve prior to a
ruling, believing that the defendant might be compelled to concede to an
adverse judgment, even if that belief later proves false.226
Practice, however, shows that the conventional belief regarding the
efficacy of the WTO sanctions in light of remedies is questionable or, at best,
exaggerated. 7 Much of the evidence points in the opposite direction.
Decisions of the DSB and the consequent remedies have proved ineffective
in stemming the tide of breaches of international trade obligations. Some
countries simply defy decisions of the DSB that are politically unpalatable at
home, preferring to suffer retaliation than to honor their legal obligations.228
Other rich countries may opt to "buy out" of their obligations by providing
"compensation" or enduring "suspension of obligation" while retaining
measures that harm and distort trade.229 Even municipal tribunals do not feel
bound by WTO panel findings, treating them as sources of information rather
Subsidy cases have become the most difficult to
than binding decisions.2

222. John Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings
on the Nature ofLegal Obligation,91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 62-64 (1997).
223. See Princen, supra note 220, at 556 (analyzing the interplay of international law
and domestic politics in producing compliance with WTO law and concluding, inter alia,
that the role of European trade officials is crucial in producing compliance).
224. Id. at 557. See also Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargainingin the Shadow of
the Law: Early Settlements in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158, 159
(2000) (arguing that "cases in which the regime's bluff has been called (i.e., those in
which judgments are issued) are likely to be those in which the regime's normative power
holds little sway over the defendant").
225. See Eric Reinhardt, Adjudication Without Enforcement in GATT Disputes, 45(2) J.
CONFLICT RES. 174 (2001).
226. See id.at 174.
227. See generally Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law
65 U. PITT. L. REv. 763 (2004) (questioning the efficacy of WTO sanctions in light of the

remedies).
228. See Steinberg, supra note 210, at 249.
229. John Jackson, Editorial Comment, International Law Status of WTO Dispute
Sett!ement Reports: Obligations to Comply or Option to 'Buy Out'? 98 AM. J. INT'L L.

109, 120-21 (2004).
230. Hyundai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 302 (1999).
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remedy, 231 arguably because they often require radical changes to the
domestic legislation of the major, trading countries, which they are not
prepared to make. Anti-WTO sentiment in the United States Congress often
makes it difficult to effect amendments to domestic legislation that violate
trade rules.
The United States' "Byrd Amendment" - the Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA) - is one example of the helplessness
of the DSB in the face of domestic intransigence. The Economist regards the
CDSOA as one of "the most outrageous weapons in America's tradeprotection arsenal. 232 It provides for distribution to certain "affected
domestic producers" of amounts assessed pursuant to countervailing duty
orders, antidumping duty orders and findings under the Antidumping Act of
1921, in order to cover certain "qualifying expenditures. '233 A complaint
was lodged before the WTO Appellate Body, alleging that the U.S. measure
violated the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement and SCM Agreement
prohibiting "specific action against" dumping or subsidies except in
accordance with GATT as interpreted by those agreements. The Appellate
Body found that the CDSOA is a specific action against dumping and
subsidies, as it provides disincentives for exporters to dump or receive
subsidies.234
It is unlikely that the Bush administration will amend the CDSOA,
which is "extremely popular" among American senators. 235
As The
Economist bemoaned: "It is a pity that, while America's lawmakers squeal
about the importance of fair rules for global trade, they
are reluctant to
2 36
accept the WTO as a judge of what is fair and what is not."

231. See Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO Dispute Settlement
System Implementation Procedure: A System in Need of Reform, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
BUS. 709, 709-13 (2000). See also J. Michael Showalter, Notes, A Cruel Trilemma: The
Flawed Political Economy of Remedies to WTO Subsidies Disputes, 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 587 (2004) (examining the effectiveness of WTO at remedying disputes
involving trade subsidies).
232. Byrd-brained, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2004, at 73.
233. An 'affected domestic producer' is a person that was a petitioner or interested party
in support of the petition with respect to which an anti-dumping duty order, a finding
under the Antidumping Act of 1921, or a countervailing duty order was entered.
'Qualifying expenditures' are expenditures incurred to produce the relevant product after
entry of the relevant order.
234. Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset
Act of 2000, para. 239, Jan. 27, 2003, WT/DS217,234/AB/R.
[A] measure that may be taken only when the constituent elements of dumping or a
subsidy are present, is a 'specific action' in response to dumping within the
meaning of Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or a 'specific action' in
response to a subsidization within the meaning of Article 32.1 of the SCM
Agreement. In other words, the measure must be inextricably linked to or have a
strong correlation with the constituent elements of dumping or of a subsidy.
Id.
235. Byrd-brained, supra note 232, at 73 (reporting that over S700m was distributed
under the Byrd law by 2003 and that an estimated sum of $2.35 billion is expected to be
distributed to companies by 2009).
236. Id.
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III. COUNTERMEASURES AS REMEDIES FOR BREACHES OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE OBLIGATIONS
Clearly, the existing WTO remedies are ineffective in checking
breaches of international trade obligations by the powerful WTO members.
What then, are the remedies available to weak states, such as those in Africa?
Are they entitled to withdraw trade concessions and to adopt other unilateral
measures to protect their economies? Are the WTO obligations erga omnes,
such that no divorce is permitted for marriages contracted under its
agreements? The last question is particularly in order to put the question of
countermeasures in its right setting. This Part of the Article argues that,
given the ineffectiveness of existing WTO remedies, African states are
justified in adopting unilateral but collective countermeasures to remedy
breaches of international trade rules, in line with general principles of
international law. It suggests specific measures that African countries could
adopt to preserve their economies from total collapse.
A.

Are WTO ObligationsErga Omnes or Reciprocal?

A secondary, yet critical, question is the nature of WTO obligations;
are they reciprocal or erga omnes? Is it correct to assert, as does Debra
Steger, that WTO agreements are no longer simply contracts "with
provisions that governments can interpret in their own way or withdraw from
at their own convenience? ' 237 This question is not merely moot; rather,
answering it serves the purpose of permissibility of inter se modifications to
WTO agreements and the acceptability of suspension of such obligations in
response to a breach. 238 Brownlie asserts that a corollary of the sovereignty
and equality of states is the dependence of obligations arising from
customary law and treaties on the consent of the obligor.239 Such an
assertion implies that the power of an international organization - in this
case the WTO - to determine its own competence, to take decisions by
majority vote and to enforce decisions depend on the consent of member
states.24°
According to Gerald Fitzmaurice, multilateral treaties give rise to two
types of obligations, "reciprocal" or "integral. 241
Treaties of the
reciprocating or concessionary type provide for "a mutual interchange of
benefits between the parties, with rights and obligations for each involving
specific treatment at the hands of and towards each of the others

237. Debra P. Steger, Afterward: The "Trade and..." Conundrum - A Commentary,

96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 135, 138 (2002).
238. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Nature of WTO Obligations, JEAN MONNET WORKING
PAPER 1/02, at 3-4 (2002) [hereinafter Pauwelyn, WTO Obligations] (arguing that a

further reason for classifying WTO obligations relates to rules on standing to bring a
complaint before a WTO panel).
239. See BROWNLIE, supra note 52, at 289-90.
240 See id.
241. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Law of Treaties: Third Report of the Special Rapporteur,2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 (1958).
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individually., 242 Contrariwise, treaties of the "integral type" are those
"where the force of the obligation is self-existent, absolute and inherent for
each party. 243 The Genocide Convention244 provides a classic example of a
multilateral treaty of an integral or erga omnes obligation. In the
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide,245 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated:
In such a convention [as the Genocide Convention] the contracting States do
not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common
interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the
raison d 'tre of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type
one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the
maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. The
high ideals which inspired the Convention provide, by virtue of the
24 6 common
will of the parties, the foundation and measure of all its provisions.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Alvarez went further to classify treaties
of the type of the Genocide Convention as follows: "To begin with, they
have a universal character; they are, in a sense, the Constitution of
international society, the new internationalconstitutionallaw. They are not

established for the benefit of private interests but for that of the general
*
,,241
interest.
Joost Pauwelyn enumerates other instances "where a treaty was
characterized as transcending the interests of the parties directly concerned
and as constituting a so-called objective regime, binding even on nonparties. 24 8 One instance was the Wimbledon case,249 where the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) found that the international regime for
the Kiel Canal (set out in the Versailles Peace Treaty) was binding also on
Germany, even though Germany was not a party to the treaty. Another
242. Id. art. 18(2).
243. Id. art. 19. Fitzmaurice adds a third type of multilateral treaties, namely those of
an "interdependent nature," where "the participation of all the parties is a condition of the
obligatory force of the treaty." Fitzmaurice, Second Report, art. 29.1(iii). Disarmament
treaties can serve as examples of interdependent treaties.
244. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art.
2,Dec. 9, 1948, U.N. GAOR, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter
Genocide Convention].
245. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (1951) [hereinafter Reservations to the Genocide Convention
case].

246. Id. at 23. It was with reference, inter alia, to these "objects" that the Court made
its main finding in the case:
The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of making
reservations and that of objecting to them. It follows that it is the compatibility of a
reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the
criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as
for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation.
Id. at 24. Cf Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19(c), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (prohibiting reservations that are
"incompatible with the object and purpose of [a] treaty").
247. Reservations to the Genocide Convention case, supra note 5, at 51.
248. Pauwelyn, WTO Obligations,supra note 238, at 4.

249. Wimbledon case, PCIJ Reports 1923, Series A, No. 1 (1923).
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instance was the Dispute on the Regime of Demilitarizationfor the Aaland
Islands, where an ad hoc Committee of Jurists decided that the Paris Peace
Settlement of 1856 setting out international obligations on demilitarization
was binding on, and could be invoked by, Sweden and Finland, though they
were not parties to the settlement.50
According to Pauwelyn, "the fact that WTO rules derive from a
multilateral treaty is not enough for WTO obligations to be of the integral
type."25 ' He explicitly endorses the contractual analogy as a model for
international treaties, though other scholars point out its limitations.
Evangelos Raftopoulos argues that while treaties are like contracts in form,
they are unlike contracts in interpretation and enforcement.2 52 Pauwelyn
cites the Commentary to Article 42(a) of the ILC Final Draft Articles on
State Responsibility to support his thesis. The Commentary confirms that
the "bilateral obligations" referred to are
intended to cover cases where the performance of an obligation under a
multilateral treaty or customary international law is owed to one particular
State ...although a multilateral treaty will characteristically establish a
framework of rules applicable to all the States parties, in certain cases its
performance in a given situation involves a relationship of a bilateral character
between two parties. Multilateral treaties of this kind
253 have often been referred
to as giving rise to 'bundles of bilateral relations.'
Pauwelyn's central thesis, which he advances elsewhere,254 is that there
is no systemic reason why obligations under non-WTO treaties should not
prevail over WTO law as leges speciales. In any event, "it is for the party
claiming that a treaty has 'contracted out' of general international law to
prove it. '' 211 Pauwelyn, however, argues that obligations of the reciprocal
type should not be confused with obligations, the performance of which is
inherently conditional on reciprocity, since reciprocal obligations may well

250. See Report of the International Committee of Jurists entrusted by the Council of
the League of Nations with the task of giving an advisory opinion upon the legal aspects of
the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations 1920 O.J. SPEC. ED. 3.
251. Pauwelyn, WTO Obligations,supra note 239, at 11.
252. See EVANGELOS

RAFTOPOULOS,

THE INADEQUACY OF THE CONTRACTUAL

ANALOGY IN THE LAW OF TREATIES (1990) (observing that, although treaties resemble
contracts in form, they differ in interpretation and enforcement). Cf P. Allott, The
Concept ofInternationalLaw, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 31, 44 (1999).
253. International Law Commission (ILC), Report on the work of the fifty-third session,

para. 8 (Aug. 10, 2001) General Assembly, Official Records, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 10
(A/56/10), at 298. See also Pauwelyn, WTO Obligations, supra note 238, at 11.
254. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public InternationalLaw in the WTO: How far
Can We Go? 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535 (2001).
255. See generally JOOST PAUWELYN,
CONFLICT OF NORMS
IN
PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW (2003). Cf ILC, James Crawford, Third Report, in SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY, A/CN.4/507, para. 150 (2000) (discussing the "presumption against the
creation of wholly self-contained regimes in the field of reparation").
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be unconditional, objective and self-existent in the sense that they must be
complied with irrespective of compliance by other state parties.256
The present writer agrees with Pauwelyn that the WTO agreements are
reciprocal and that obligations arising therein are erga omnes partes, that is,
owed not to all states but to all the parties to the agreements. These
agreements concern obligations that expressly or by necessary implication
relate to matters of common interest of the parties. 257 Parties to the WTO
agreements must fulfill obligations arising therein in good faith, based on the
sacred principle pacta sunt servanda.258 However, to argue, as does Debra
Steger, that the Marrakesh Agreement "is no longer simply a contract, with
provisions that governments can interpret in their own way or withdraw from
at their own convenience, 259 is to do violence to legal and rational thought.
It is both odd and silly to expect some states to observe provisions of a treaty
that other, albeit powerful, states are at liberty to flout.
Observably, most African states that have ratified or acceded to the
WTO agreements have made strenuous efforts to honor their obligations
therein, sometimes at great economic and social costs. Yet, international law
does not generally prevent a state from taking appropriate measures to
safeguard its essential interests. 260 The Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Act of 2001261 permits an injured state to take
countermeasures in response to an internationally wrongful act.262 This, of
course, is without prejudice to other remedies that may be available under
international law, such as cessation, non-repetition, and reparation. Are
countermeasures limited to the temporary non-performance of one or some
of the international obligations of the injured state or can they be more
extensive? The ILC suggests such a limitation; 263 but Cassese has argued
that "[i]n the event of a breach of international law, the injured State is
legally entitled to disregard an international obligation owed to the
delinquent State.,, 26 4 Even so, countermeasures may be taken only against
the state responsible for the wrongful act; 265 and a failure to observe such a

256. See Pauwelyn, WTO Obligations,supra note 238, at 12 (citing the MFN clause as
an example of an unconditional obligation).
257. See Siegel, supra note 47, at 563 (arguing that, "as a legal matter, members'
substantive obligations under the WTO Agreements flow from one member to another, as
under the GATT").
258. Cf Vienna Convention, supra note 248, art. 26 (providing "[e]very treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith").
259. See Steger, supra note 237, at 138 (arguing further that "somewhere between the
end of the Tokyo Round and the end of the Uruguay Round, [the GATT] became an
international system of rules, of legal norms, considerably more extensive and binding
than the reciprocal exchanges of bindings and concessions that had characterized the
original GATT").
260. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 300-04 (2000).
261. See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act, annexed
to G.A. Res. 56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA].
262. Id. art. 49(1).
263. Id. art. 49(2),(3).
264. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 234 (2001).
265. ARSIWA, supra note 261, art. 49(1).
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act, giving rise to state
limitation "will constitute an internationally wrongful
2' 66
responsibility and possible countermeasures.
The Vienna Convention permits any party to a treaty - not just the
party specially affected by the breach - to suspend the treaty, in whole or in
part, with respect to itself "if the treaty is of such a character that a material
breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every
party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the
treaty. 267 Neither the suspension of treaty obligations nor the adoption of
protective measures is strange to the WTO treaty regime. The Agreement on
Safeguards and Article XIX of GATT 1994268 provides that a WTO member
may apply safeguard measures if, following an investigation by competent
authorities, it determines that imports have increased, that the increase was a
result of unforeseen developments, and that the increased imports have
caused, or threatened to cause, its domestic industry to suffer serious
injury.269 Unilateral trade measures are also permitted to protect the
environment, 27° a practice that the WTO Appellate Body has upheld in many
of its decisions. In the United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products,271 the Appellate Body held that the United States
embargo on turtle-unfriendly shrimp qualified as a bona fide conservative
measure. This decision, according to Robert Howse, "enfranchised the
who had been marginalized as 'critics,'
previously 'external' constituencies,
272
as 'trade and ...people.'
The WTO Appellate Body has held that unilateral trade measures
directed at other countries' policies are not excluded from justifiability under
GATT; 273 to be justified, however, such measures must not be applied with
"arbitrary" or "unjustified" discrimination. In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the
Appellate Body held that, in taking conservative measures, the United States
failed to make a serious effort to reach a negotiated agreement with the
complainants; that the scheme was applied in an inflexible manner to
different countries where different conditions prevailed; and that its

266. N.D. White and A. Abass, Countermeasures and Sanctions, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW 505, 508 (Malcolm Evans ed., 2003).
267. Vienna Convention, supra note 246, art. 60(2)(c).
268. The Agreement on Safeguards and the GATT 1994 are each part of the body of
substantive rules that make up the WTO and are binding on all members. They are
contained in Annex IA to the Agreement Establishing the WTO. See General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, Annex IA, [hereinafter
GATT], in LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 24.

269. The Agreement, however, provides that the competent authorities must issue a
"report setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues
of fact and law." Id. art. II.i.
270. Id. art. XX(g).
271. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtlecase].
272. Howse, supra note 98, at I 1l.
273. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, paras. 107, 137-38
(Oct. 22, 2001).
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enforcement at the border lacked due process and transparency. 2 74 General
international law also requires that countermeasures should be commensurate
with the injury suffered, "taking into account the gravity of the
'275
internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.
Some commentators have argued that countermeasures related to
subsidy should be limited to cases where the subsidy in question has a
"cross-border" effect via an effect on the output of the recipients.
Such an
argument is weakened by the fact that national borders are no longer natural
firebreaks in an age of globalization; the contagious effects of subsidies are
likely to spread beyond national frontiers.
B.

The Imperatives of UnilateralCountermeasuresby Africa

Many states have come to recognize that trade, not aid, is the engine of
economic growth and the most potentially serious and sustainable stimulus to
development. Thus, some powerful countries have refused to let the canoes
of the WTO and Bretton Woods institutions drive their economies in the cold
waters of globalization; the sovereignties of these states have remained
impenetrable. The United States has clearly specified that WTO agreements
shall not supersede federal laws: "No provision of any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall
have effect.... Nothing in this Act shall be construed to amend or modify
any law of the United States., 277 Courts in the United States also recognize
the supremacy of the Constitution over treaties arguably to secure the
country's sovereignty. Thus, in Reid v. Covert,2 78 the United States Supreme
Court held that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the
Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the
restraints of the Constitution. 279
The present writer asserts that African states cannot afford to adhere
blindly to WTO rules even when they hurt their economies and pose serious
threats to their sovereignties. So what are the options?
1.

What Africa Must do
Africa must fashion effective measures to checkmate flagrant breaches
of international trade obligations by industrial countries, in the light of the
274. See Shrimp/Turtle case, supra note 271 (citing GATT, supra note 268, preambular
paragraph of art. XX).
275. See ARSIWA, supra note 261, art. 51. See also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia),Judgment, ICJ REP. 7, paras. 83-85 (1997).
276. See Charles J. Goetz et al., The Meaning of "Subsidy" and "Injury" in the
CountervailingDuty Law, 6 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 17 (1986).
277. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1),(a)(2) (2000). See also id. § 3512(b)(2)(a) (providing that

no state law "may be declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that
the provision or application is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
except in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or
application invalid").
278. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
279. Id. at 16.
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DSU's failure to provide effective remedies. First, African states should
constantly reevaluate each of the WTO agreements in order to know when to
suspend treaty obligations. They should unilaterally withdraw trade until
there is evidence of good-faith performance by the industrial countries.
Second, they should make no further concessions until they can bring home
to their people trophies for earlier concessions. Jeffrey Schott believes that
the industrial countries have very little left to offer Africa in terms of market
access, "except what is very difficult to give - that is, the protection in
agriculture and textiles that has survived eight previous rounds of
multilateral trade negotiations and that is of major export interest to
developing countries. 28 ° Yet, he disingenuously asks developing countries
to offer more "concrete reductions in their protection" in order to get the
281
The present writer
industrial countries "to commit to significant reforms.,
believes that a government has no business granting market access and tariff
reductions to another government if it is not sure that the corresponding
access of its exporters to that country's market is secure.
Third, African states should select their import tariffs in a way that best
achieves their policy objectives and should not take on new WTO
commitments until other parties have fulfilled their commitments to
liberalize trade in specific areas of interest to Africa. Fourth, they should
ensure that future trade negotiations with the North take into account the
development and industrialization needs of Africa and address existing
barriers that industrial countries continue to place on the path of the
continent's development. These barriers include access to industrial country
markets; the application of SDT for developing countries; trade capacity
building, including technical assistance to enable African countries take
advantage of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism; the application of
2 82
African
antidumping and safeguard measures; and the problems of LDCs.
states should ensure that compliance with future WTO rules is in deference
to Africa's political choices and development priorities and that it
"promote[s] the sustainable development of [Africa], contribute[s] to poverty
eradication and facilitate[s] the smooth integration of African countries into
the world economy.,

283

Fifth, African states should take the lead in TRIPS negotiations and in
implementing measures identified for promoting access to affordable generic
drugs - in line with the decision of the AU Assembly at its January 2005
summit in Abuja, Nigeria.284 Africa will continue to experience stunted
280. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: U.S. STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 17 (Jeffrey J.
Schott ed., 2004) [hereinafter FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS].
281. See id.
282. See, e.g., Sam Laird, The WTO Agenda and the Developing Countries, in TRADE
LIBERALIZATION, COMPETITION AND THE WTO, 227, 229 (Chris Milner & Robert Read
eds., 2002).
283. Declaration on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) Negotiations, AU
Assembly, 2d Ord. Sess., para. 9, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Decl.5 (II) (July 2003)
[hereinafter Declaration on EPA Negotiations].
284. See Decision on the Interim Report on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria and
Polio, AU Assembly 5 th Ord. Sess., para. 7(a), Assembly/AU/Dec.55 (IV) (Jan. 2005).
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economic growth so long as preventable diseases like HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria continue to kill millions of its workforces. Sixth,
and the most important of all, African states should take the subsidy of
agriculture more seriously and should make fertilizer and other essentials not
only available to, but also affordable for African farmers. They should curb
imports to protect local production and should impose necessary tariffs to
enable local farmers and pastoralists to receive fair prices for their products.
States should adopt special policies and strategies targeted at small
scale and traditional farmers in rural areas, in line with the AU Declaration
on Agriculture of 2003.85 They should create conditions that will engineer
private sector participation in agricultural development, "with emphasis on
human capacity development and the removal of constraints to agricultural
production and marketing, including soil fertility, poor water management,
inadequate infrastructure, pests and diseases. 286 They should support the
provision of irrigation equipment and develop arable lands, particularly when
private agents are unwilling to do so. 28 7 They should seize the opportunity
provided by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) - which is
providing funding to forty-nine countries for medium-term investment
programs to fast-track the implementation of Comprehensive African
Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) 288 to strengthen their
respective agricultural sectors.
Lastly, Africa should continue to explore new bilateral and regional
trade agreements and build linkages with other regional trade organizations,
such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the
Economic Community of the Southern Cone [MERCOSUR]. Of course, the
"spaghetti bowl" of customs union, common markets, regional and
bilateral
free trade areas, preferences, and an endless assortment of miscellaneous
trade deals undermine the most basic principle of multilateral trade and of
the WTO: non-discrimination, which now appears to be the exception rather
than the rule. 2 89 However, the stampede towards new trading arrangements
may be indicative of the Uruguay Round's failure to deliver on its enticing
promises. 290 In any event, groups based on regional trade arrangements and
other configurations may be more effective, since the sheer number of actors
in global trade talks makes coalitions difficult to build and consensus elusive.
The ACP-EU Cotonou partnership agreement offers one possible route
to the realization of Africa's economic interest. The Cotonou Agreement is a
"comprehensive and integrated approach for a strengthened
partnership
285. See Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, AU Assembly, 2d

Ord. Sess., para. 1, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Decl.5

(II)

(July 2003)

[hereinafter

Declaration on Agriculture & Food Security].
286. Id.
287. See NEPAD, supra note 99, para. 135.
288. See Decision on the Implementation of the New Partnership For Africa's
Development (NEPAD), AU Assembly 3d Ord. Sess. para. 8, Assembly/AU/Dec.38 (III)
(July 2004) [hereinafter Decision on Implementation of NEPAD].
289. See THE FUTURE OF THE WTO, supra note 21, at 19.
290. See generally Carlos Primo Braga, Comments on the Proliferation of Regional
IntegrationArrangements, 27 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 963 (1996).
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based on political dialogue, development cooperation, and economic and
trade relations." 29' Success in the partnership, however, requires synergies
between the EPA process and ACP-EU cooperation, notably in the context of
regional indicative programs. If effectively managed, the partnership could
provide the answer to the continent's concerns, enhance regional integration
process and development in Africa, and build regional markets through the
removal of production, supply, and trade constraints. It could also enhance
cooperation in areas that are important to trade, such as labor standards and
environment, issues that the current WTO regime neglects.
Africa need not be apologetic when taking unilateral countermeasures;
such measures have become facts of international trade politics, reflecting
the fact that, "in some cases an individual state might actually need to
292
The
increase trade protection to manage a crisis in an adequate manner.,
unilaterally,
acts
United States - always a unique case study - regularly
rather than behind the cloak of the WTO, when its special economic interest
is at stake. As Joseph Stiglitz reveals:
The U.S. Trade Representative or the Department of Commerce, often prodded
by special interests within the United States, brings an accusation against a
foreign country; there is then a review process-involving only the U.S.
government-with a decision made by the United States, after which sanctions
are brought against the offending country. The United States sets itself up as
prosecutor, judge, and jury. There is a quasi-judicial process, but the cards are
stacked: both the rules and the judges favor a finding of guilty. When this
arsenal is brought against other industrial countries, Europe and Japan, they
have the resources to defend themselves; when it comes to the developing
countries, even large ones like India and China, it is an unfair match.... The
does little to reinforce confidence in a just international trading
process 29itself
3
system.

2.

Are CountermeasuresSelf-destructive?

There may be genuine questions regarding the efficacy of
countermeasures to check breaches of international trade obligations and
how Africa can employ such weapons without doing damage to its economy
and the goals of trade liberalization. With regards to efficacy, there is no
doubt that "a government's temptation to withdraw a concession would be
moderated if it believed that the other government would retaliate by
withdrawing its own concession, as a withdrawal would induce movement
back toward the unilateral outcome. 294 Unilateral countermeasures might
make it possible, though by no means certain, for the industrial countries to
begin some measured compliance with the existing trade rules.
With regards to the possible effects of countermeasures, one may
surmise that such measures might make Africa to "shoot itself in the foot,"
by restricting imports and, thus, hurting its own industrial users, importers,
291.
292.
293.
294.

Cotonou Agreement, supra note 123, pmbl.
Howse, supra note 98, at 95.
STIGLITZ,

supra note 61, at 62.

Bagwell et al., supra note 78, at 57.
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and consumers. Some believe that Africa's economy stands in danger of
going down the drain on account of retaliatory measures, 295 given its
hibernated state.
This potential danger, however, needs not to be
exaggerated, since it is not only the welfare of each state that stands in such
danger; the system as a whole stands in danger of going down the drain when
each nation retaliates and turns inward to protect itself. No country is an
island, entire by itself, no matter how powerful. "It is a law of the natural
universe," says C. S. Lewis, "that no being can exist on its own resources.
Everyone, everything, is hopelessly indebted to everyone and everything
else. 296
Market access is not about charity; it is about justice and mutual
benefits. It is sheer arrogance for the North to think that it can do without
Africa's markets for its finished products. Being both a participant and
victim in the game of globalization, the North can only ignore Africa to its
own hazard. It needs Africa's wealth, and Muammar Ghaddafi gave the
reasons during his groundbreaking welcome address to the AU Assembly in
Libya, in July 2005:297
Fifty per cent of the world's gold reserves are in Africa, a quarter of the
world's uranium reserves are in Africa, and 95% of the world's diamonds are
in Africa. A third of chrome is also in Africa, as is cobalt. Sixty-five per cent
of the world's production of cocoa is in Africa. Africa has 25,000 km of
rivers. Africa is rich in unexploited natural resources, but we were [and still
are] forced to sell these resources cheaply to get hard currency. And this must
stop. 298
3.

The Role of the A U
To be effective, countermeasures must be collective, since no African
state is economically powerful enough to construct a modem economy on its
own, let alone confront Western capitalism. 299 Africa must unite, otherwise
the industrial countries will continue to use the WTO to exploit their
differences in national priorities and regulations as, indeed, they have done
in the past. The AU should spearhead the crusade for countermeasures, in
line with its undertaking to "take up the multifaceted challenges that confront
our continent and peoples in the light of the social, economic and political
30 0
changes taking place in the world.,
295.

CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929-1939,

(1973).

at

242

296. C.S. LEWIS, GOD IN THE DOCK 63 (1979).
297. See Welcome address by Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya to the Fifth Ordinary
Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly in Sirte, Libya, in July 2005, NEw AFRICAN,
Aug./Sept. 2005, at 31 (expressing disappointment over the AU's "unsatisfactory"
performance since its creation and warning that its inability to deliver on its promise
"makes the African people feel frustrated that the Union which is supposed
to achieve

their aspirations has slid into the same mire which engulfed the [OAU]") Id.
298. Id. at 33.

299. See generally REGINALD GREEN & ANN SEIDMAN, UNITY OR POVERTY? THE
ECONOMICS OF PAN-AFRiCANISM (1968).

300. AU Act, supra note 6, pmbl.
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The objectives of the AU include the raising of living standards of
30 1
Africans'through cooperation in all fields of human activity, including, of
course, trade. It also has the promotion and defense of "African common
30 2
It seeks,
positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples.
the
enable
which
conditions
"necessary
establish
to
importantly,
more
international
in
and
economy
global
the
in
role
rightful
its
continent to play
negotiations; '30 3 but, as Ghaddafi asks,
how can we prepare the continent to play such a role when, for example, The
Gambia is negotiating with the giant blocs on an individual basis, or Tunisia,
Libya, Djibouti and so on. What are we going to achieve? What weight do
markets and great blocs: China, Japan,
these states have
3 4 vis-A-vis the huge
Nafta or Euro? 0
Surely, the AU Act provides the normative basis for the AU to regulate
the exercise of free trade in Africa, which should include the harmonization
of technical and regulatory frameworks for trade, such as customs tariffs for
imports to Africa.3 °5 The AU should also assist its members in developing
antidumping rules, as dumping of products is killing African domestic
industries. These measures are necessary not only to meet the demands of
sustainable development but also to prevent the social apartheid and
exclusion that inevitably accompany globalization and free trade.
IV. REFORMING THE WTO FOR A TRUE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The imperatives of globalization make the existence of international
institutions an attractive option because they present themselves as bulwarks
to governments in times of crisis, when they like to feel that an international
agency is in charge and doing something. Both critics and supporters of the
WTO agree that international economic cooperation is needed to address
challenges of globalization and that a strong multilateral trading system is30a6
governance.
vitally important part of an emerging system of global
Obviously, "[a] stronger and more open multilateral trading system can make
a broader contribution to international peace and stability through the forging
of ever closer and mutually beneficial ties between nations, and cementing
30 7
For these and other
these ties through legally binding commitments.
reasons, some commentators believe that it is "an odd prescription" to
°8
advocate a turn away from the WTO.3
This final Part examines some perspectives on WTO reform and
suggests critical areas requiring immediate attention in order to strengthen
the institution for a true global governance.

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. art. 3(k).
Id. art. 3(d).
Id. art. 3(i).
Ghaddafi, supra note 297, at 31.
Cf NEPAD, supra note 99, para. 161.
See Lamy, supra note 151.
WTO Annual Report 2003, supra note 79, at 3.
Guzman, supra note 43, at 307.
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A.

Perspectives on the WTO Reform
Contemporary international economic law raises concerns regarding the
capability and legitimacy of the WTO, as presently fashioned, to bring about
a just IEO. The reason is because the WTO appears to be "an over-worked
and controversial" body,30 9 operating under some shadow of a legitimacy

crisis, and grappling with what its Director-General calls "fundamental
tensions. 310 Some commentators believe that one of the biggest challenges
confronting the institution is to determine its mission.3 Questions remain
as to whether one global institution has the capacity to organize and
guarantee fair trade in this "multipolar and multicivilizational" era.312
Scholars of different hue are also grappling, both at the theoretical and
practical levels, with how to deal with the current neo-liberalism. Enrique
Carrasco, for example, argues for an analytical model that remains
constructively critical of neo-liberalism but without proposing radical
systemic change to the prevailing model of socio-economic organization.313
Others, however, call for new international norms and parallel institutions to
address core issues of concern to a majority of states. Eleanor Fox calls for a
free standing "World Competition Forum." 3t 4 Andrew Guzman calls for a
"World Economic Organization," which entails restructuring the WTO along
departmental lines that "permit its expansion into new areas while taming its
trade bias. 31 5 Others call for a revision or even jettisoning of existing trade
law for one that offers flexibility and enables "plurilateral agreements" that
are binding only for a limited number of willing members.31 6 Still, some call
for a stop to the expansion of the WTO into non-trade areas.317
These perspectives suggest a deep uncertainty, if not a deeper
ambivalence, regarding the ultimate implications of neo-liberalism. 31 8 They
suggest, in particular, that all is not well with the WTO and that it needs
reinforcement in order to meet future expectations and withstand possible
challenges. The present writer believes that the time has come for the
international community to change the rules currently shaping the LEO. A
genuine spirit and a common hope must drive any new LEO, a spirit that

309.
310.
311.
28, 28

DUNKLEY, supra note 49, at 270.
Panitchpakdi, supra note 21, at 3.
Steve Charnovitz, Triangulatingthe World Trade Organization,96 AM. J. INT'L L.
(2002).

312.

Cf SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING

OF WORLD ORDER 19-29 (1996).

313. See Enrique R. Carrasco, Opposition, Justice, Structuralism, and Particularity:
Intersections Between LatCrit and Law and Development Studies, 28 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REv. 313, 314-17, 327-36 (1997).
314. See generally Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Millennium Round, 2 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 665 (1999) (advocating the creation of a "free standing World Competition
Forum").
315. Guzman, supranote 43, at 307.
316. Cf Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 11.3. & X.9.
317. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,
114 HARv. L. REv. 511, 514 (2000).
318. See Brown, supranote 22, at 810.
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seeks to restore human dignity for all. The basic objectives of an integral
development must include equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of
wealth and income, and the full participation of countries and their peoples
in decisions relating to their own development. These objectives will remain
mere pipe dreams as long as the North continues to use the WTO and allied
institutions as instruments of trade and financial imperialism against the
South.
B.

CriticalMatters to be Addressed

The present writer believes that the WTO might be able to realize parts
of its visions if it changes its methodology for delivery and if, more
especially, it allows developing countries, which form two-thirds of its
current membership, to have a sense of ownership in the free trade agenda.
The starting point should be to democratize the institution to allow for
proportional representation and decision-making by developing nations. It is
only within a framework of inclusive global governance, one that recognizes
the values of partnership among all peoples, that Africa can participate
39
meaningfully in the global economy and body politic. ' As Paul Martin, the
Canadian Prime Minister, said, "policies to promote development ... will
work only if the developing countries and emerging markets help shape
them, because inclusiveness lies at the heart of legitimacy and
effectiveness. 320
The DSU also requires reconstruction, as it, is seriously flawed in its
current form. Some commentators have suggested an aggressive application
of certain non-WTO norms by the DSB and that these panels should take
international commitments made outside the WTO into account when
evaluating state conduct. 321 Others advocate limited use of "non-violation"
complaints under Article XXIII 1(b), and the abolition of "situation"
complaints under Article XXIII l(c) of GATT 1994,322 though this is met
with strident disagreements. For Debra Steger, "if we accept that the WTO
of action for
Agreement is rules based, then the logical and meaningful 32cause
3
them.,
violating
of
claim
a
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rules
those
of
transgressions
The WTO is a Trojan horse that influences domestic policymaking both
in trade and non-trade areas, including environmental policy, human rights,
319. Nsongurua J. Udombana, How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the New
Partnershipfor Africa's Development, 20(2) B.U. INT'L L.J. 293, 322 (2002).
320. Honorable Paul Martin, Address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Jan.
24, 2001), available at www.fin.gc.ca/news01/01-009e.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
Cf Algiers Declaration, supra note 85 (calling for a genuine democratization of
international relations based on the active participation and a balanced consideration of the
legitimate concerns of all nations). The Honorable Paul Martin also asserted: "We believe

that globalization should be placed within the framework of a democratically conceived
dynamics, and implemented collectively to make it an institution capable of fulfilling the
hope for a concerted development of mankind and prosperity shared by all peoples." Id.
321. See PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW supra

note 256, at 456-72.
322. See PETERSMANN, supra note 205, at ch. 4.
323. Steger, supra note 237, at 138.
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labor, and competition. 324 Yet, it has been developing in isolation, "a fact
which produced a single-minded free trade perspective. 325 It must construct
complementary structures on non-trade, social goals and must concern itself
with the abuse of labor rights and the protection of the health and safety of
indigenous populations, including trade restrictions aimed at preserving the
natural resources on which their future relies. The DSB should, meanwhile,
take these and related human rights problems into consideration when
interpreting the WTO agreements.326
The same should be true for
environmental issues; on this, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) 327 offers an example on how to mesh the demands of free trade
with the protection of the environment. The NAFTA expressly gives priority
to several named multilateral environmental agreements whenever trade
restrictions undertaken in pursuit of their terms would otherwise violate its
expansive "GATT-plus" trade disciplines. 2
The WTO and the industrial countries must work towards building
capacities of African and other developing countries to take advantage of
opportunities that free trade offers. It is too late in the day for the WTO to
insist that its "core role is trade opening" and "not a development agency,, 329
in a global environment where trade, investment, finance, and development
are increasingly intertwined. Those who pursue trade at the expense of
justice, human rights, and development must realize that there is more to life
than profit and GDP and that "a country could have a high overall per capita
GDP but also have a majority of the population living in poverty. '330 Life is
primarily about promoting human dignity, happiness, and values; profit and
GDP are means to these ends. There is a fatal tendency in human activities
for the means to encroach upon the very ends they were intended to serve;
and when the means are autonomous, they are deadly.
CONCLUSION: A QUESTION OF JUSTICE
This Article concludes that the struggle for a fair global trade is a
legitimate struggle, as it raises legitimate questions of justice. It is a struggle
between freedom and enslavement, including the right of workers in
developing countries to be free from foreign government's unfair trade
324. See id. at 135 et seq. (analyzing the non-trade, social, issues). See also Guzman,
supra note 43, at 306 (noting that "[t]he power of the WTO has already caused its reach to
extend into non-trade related issues such as health and safety, intellectual property, and the
environment"); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
733, 739-45 (1999) (discussing several "trade and..." issues, including environment,
labor, competition, intellectual property, investment, and culture).
325. See ROBERT HOWSE & MAKAU MUTUA, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 11 (2000).
326. See generally Stephen J. Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade
OrganizationRules 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219 (2004).
327. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
328. See id. art. 104.
329. Lamy, supra note 151.
330. Wesley T. Milner et al., Security Rights, Subsistence Rights, and Liberties: A
Theoretical Survey of the EmpiricalLandscape, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 403, 411 (1999).
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practices. An honest impact assessment of international trade since Africa's
union with the WTO reveals a fairy tale ending in reverse: "and so they lived
unhappily ever after." The reason for this unhappy union is that the
"matrimonial law" governing free trade is not about equality; it is another
form of inequality. The WTO, which implements this law, is Janus-like in
nature, offering freedom with one face and denying it with the other.
The burgeoning anti-globalization movement, including the Seattle and
Cancun debacle, graphically demonstrate that the post Cold War multilateral
trade liberalization is unsustainable and requires fine-tuning to meet current
They demonstrate that international
economic and political realities.
cooperation and globalization cannot continue with a focus on trade alone,
ignoring justice, human rights, and development. The banners hoisted at the
Seattle and Cancun protests express, in unambiguous terms, that the stated
objectives of the WTO did not serve, are not serving and, maybe, were never
intended to serve the mass of humanity. Drastic reforms of the WTO are
needed to address current trade injustices; and unless such reforms are
urgently undertaken, the WTO and its Northern Allies will find it
increasingly difficult to refute the charge that globalization is another word
for colonization. It is a mistake for perpetrators of the current trade
injustices to think that seekers of true and fair global governance will fade
away. Everyone needs an opponent to keep him on his toes; likewise for
every international institution.
While debates continue on the normative and institutional scope and
restructuring of the WTO, Africa must devise effective means of meeting the
challenges of globalization - in the spirit of the AU Act - and finding
relevance in a world where economic growth is the major means to human
and social development. Free trade, as conceived and delivered by the
North, is not a bowl of cherries; it is a rat race where the end justifies the
means. Africa must see unilateral countermeasures as a legitimate and
effective means of survival and of drawing the attention of the international
community to contemporary trade injustices, particularly as the existing
WTO remedies have patently proved to be ineffective. "The prize," says
Yoweri Museveni, "is an international trading system based on rules that
and by
promote African development by stimulating trade and investment
331
reducing Africa's often-crippling dependence on foreign aid.,
It is possible, and even probable, that free trade offers Africa the
ultimate road to economic salvation; but that is if, only if, and always if, the
continent is allowed to walk that road freely and not through blackmail or
arm-twisting. C. S. Lewis writes: "Men are not angered by mere misfortune
but by misfortune conceived as injury. And the sense of injury depends on
the feeling that a legitimate claim has been denied. 332

33 1. Yoweri Museveni, Letter to African Heads of States and Ministers, Sept. 6, 2003,
reprintedin JAWARA & KWA, supra note 1, at Lxxii.
332. C. S. LEWIS, THE SCREWTAPE LETTERS 111 (1942).

